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 Résumé 
 
Bien que plusieurs chercheurs aient analysé l'influence de divers facteurs sur 
l'intensité des conflits ethniques, il a été constaté que l'identité ethnique elle-même n'a 
jamais été correctement examinée. Ce phénomène est essentiellement dû à ce que nous 
croyons être une classification inexacte des groupes ethniques. Nous proposons une 
nouvelle méthode de catégorisation pour les identités ethniques présentant que la religion, 
la langue et la race forment les distinctions les plus précises et nous les classifions alors 
comme les identités ethniques fondamentales. Subséquemment, une étude comparative de 
ces identités ethniques a été entreprise avec l'utilisation de deux bases de données 
différentes: l’ensemble de données Battle Deaths qui est associé avec la base de données 
sur les conflits armés de l’UCDP/PRIO et  la base de données Minorities at Risk. Les 
résultats, dans leur ensemble, ont indiqué que les identités ethniques avec des attachements 
émotifs plus intenses mènent à une plus grande intensité de conflit. Les conflits ethniques 
fondamentaux ont démontré une tendance à mener à des conflits plus intenses que les 
conflits ethniques non-fondamentaux. De plus, la similitude parmi les groupes ethniques 
tend à affaiblir l'intensité des conflits. En outre, l'étude a également conclu que plus le 
nombre d'identités ethnique fondamentales impliquées dans un conflit est grand, plus le 
conflit sera intense. Cependant, les résultats ne pouvaient pas déterminer une différence 
conséquente parmi l’influence relative des trois identités ethniques fondamentales.  
 
Mots clés: ethnicité, conflit, intensité, identité, religion, langage, race. 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
 Though many have analyzed numerous factors’ influence on ethnic conflict 
intensity, it was found that ethnic identity itself has not been properly examined. This 
phenomenon is basically due to what we believe is improper ethnic group classification. 
We propose a new categorization method for ethnic identities putting forth religion, 
language and race as the clearest distinction of ethnic identity and labelling them as 
fundamental ethnic identities. Subsequently, a comparative examination of these ethnic 
identities was undertaken with the use of two different sources of data: the Battle Deaths 
dataset associated with the UCDP/PRIO data on armed conflicts and the Minorities at Risk 
dataset. The results, overall, indicated that ethnic identities with more intense emotional 
attachments lead to greater conflict intensity. Fundamental ethnic conflicts were shown to 
lead to greater intensity than non-fundamental ethnic conflicts. Also, similarity amongst 
ethnic groups was demonstrated to weaken conflict intensity. Furthermore, the study also 
concluded that the greater the number of fundamental ethnic identity differences involved 
in a conflict the more intense that conflict will be. However, the findings were unable to 
find any meaningful difference among the relative influence of the three fundamental ethnic 
identities.  
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Dangerous Identities: The Impact of Fundamental 
Ethnic Identities on Conflict Intensity 
 
All good people agree, 
And all good people say, 
All nice people, like Us, are We 
And everyone else is They: 
But if you cross over the sea, 
Instead of over the way, 
You may end by (think of it!) looking on We 
As only a sort of They!  
 
-Rudyard Kipling, We and They (1926) 
 
Introduction 
The poem above highlights just how futile the distinction between people can be. It 
illustrates that the difference between we and they may not be anything at all. However, it 
is evident that no matter how futile the distinction between groups might appear. That 
difference, whether it is perceived or real, always possesses a tremendous potential for 
conflict. The world is filled with places where differences between individuals have lead to 
havoc and misery. The places which have had the misfortune to host these terrible events 
have marked our news and our lives. They have consequently become engrained in our 
vocabulary. Kosovo, Darfur, East Timor, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland 
have a global connotation that is synonymous with hatred and destruction. Nevertheless, 
these places are but a few of the well known examples that we utilise to describe horrific 
and terrifying events, analogies of human tragedies. They are also only a few of the ethnic 
war zones that have received the gift of international media attention. A gift which is meant 
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to bring help, but so often it is empty. Examples of ethnic conflicts, where seemingly 
normal human beings do horrific things to each other, leave many perplexed and saddened. 
However, the reality is that ethnic conflicts are a universal social phenomenon that 
can occur in any society in any region of the world without much warning. The fact that 
ethnic conflicts are universal phenomena must increase our preoccupation with these 
incidents (Horowitz 1985). Ethnic conflicts, therefore, represent a source of great concern 
for countries that are composed of heterogeneous populations because ethnic differences 
make domestic peace difficult (Connor 1972; Rabushka & Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985; 
Ignatieff 1993; Moynihan 1993; Huntington 1996; Sambanis 2001). Ethnic conflicts have 
even been argued as being endemic to multi-ethnic societies (Brass 1985). These concerns 
are heightened by the fact that most countries are heterogeneous; a factor which increases 
the risk of violence (Ellingsen 2000). The anxiety attached to ethnic conflicts is created by 
the fact that they can cause tremendous destabilisation and destruction to a country or, 
even, an entire region. However, the apex of the concerns related to ethnic conflicts lies in 
their potential for death. Huth & Valentino (2008) have argued that ethnic conflicts 
enhance the likelihood of mass killings. Kegley & Wittkopf (1995) have, for their part, 
presented ethnic conflicts as one of the world’s greatest killers.  
The truth of the matter is that all conflicts possess an intrinsic destructive nature. 
However, conflicts of an ethnic nature can be considered the most destructive due to 
underlying hatreds that provoke an elevated potential of violence and loss of life. 
Unfortunately, the true essence of the destructiveness of ethnic conflicts is often 
underappreciated. Several academics had predicted the end of conflicts based on ethnic 
allegiances. The cold war had supposedly rendered conflict beyond the realm of ethnicity 
(Rubenstein 1990; Fukuyama 1992). However, history has clearly demonstrated that this 
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scenario did not materialize. Interethnic conflicts were actually in the last century at their 
most intense and endemic than they had ever been (Smith 1981). Furthermore, data 
explicitly shows that the recent trends in conflicts demonstrate a propensity towards 
internal clashes. Wallensteen & Sollenberg (1997) show that conflicts seem to have taken a 
turn towards a predominance of internal clashes after the end of the Cold War; whereas 
others demonstrate that the trend started earlier (Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Hewitt et al. 
2008). It is important to highlight that this trend towards an internalization of conflicts has 
had an important ethnic element to it because the disputes have been of a communal nature 
(Gurr 1994). Thus, the numerous conflicts of an ethnic nature in the last few decades have 
demonstrated that ethnonationalism is a constant force in the creation of conflicts that 
cannot simply be eliminated.  
A shift towards internal conflicts, centered on ethnic distinctions, reinforces 
apprehensions over ethnic conflicts. They, obviously, imply serious repercussions for 
populations at the heart of such conflicts. These conflicts can generate economic, social and 
political deterioration to any country that is in the grasps of this phenomenon. Ethnic 
conflicts can lead to states with no rule of law where governments can no longer assume 
their responsibilities and where the security of citizens can no longer be guaranteed; thus, 
representing a tremendous risk and danger for affected populations. Unfortunately, there 
are a lot of people that lie in the harmful grasp of ethnic conflicts. Gurr (1993b) found that 
one sixth of the global population was involved in ethnic conflicts; emphasizing the 
unquestionable importance which ethnic conflicts represent for the world’s population. 
Ethnic conflicts are, thus, a great danger to the security of all. It is, therefore, clear 
that ethnic conflicts demand a particular attention from the academic community in order to 
develop a better understanding and, subsequently, arrive at rectifying solutions to these 
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phenomena. This apparent concern which is posed by ethnic conflicts has, actually, resulted 
in a wide array of scientific literature that has attempted to improve our comprehension of 
conflicts of an ethnic nature. I believe that the studies which examine ethnic conflicts can 
safely be classified into three major categories: causes, the factors which lead to the onset 
of ethnic conflicts, influences, the variables which impact the intensity of ethnic conflicts, 
and resolutions, strategies which would resolve, or at the very least attenuate, the ongoing 
ethnic tensions. A look at the literature on the factors which cause ethnic conflicts and the 
variables which influence their intensity and one quickly realizes that there is never just one 
cause to a conflict or one influence that affects it. Rather, the literature presents ethnic 
conflicts as complex phenomena caused by a myriad of factors, none exclusive to ethnicity, 
and influenced by multiple variables. Thus, ethnic conflicts are not a single factor 
phenomenon. The complexity of ethnic conflicts, therefore, renders finding appropriate and 
successful resolutions quite complicated.  
Yet, although there has been much headway into important elements of ethnic 
conflicts, the research has clearly not been exhaustive. It is my belief that the large body of 
academic work which has ethnic conflicts as its focal point has made important progress. 
However, there is, undoubtedly, not a full understanding of the phenomenon. 
One such element which is not fully understood relates to the influence of ethnic 
identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. The theory that I put forward in this study is 
that ethnicity is an umbrella notion which encompasses all group identities that have ethnic 
elements as their focus. Furthermore, in line with Sambanis (2001), I bring forth that three 
specific identities form the basis of ethnicity. Religion, language and race possess 
undeniable and clear ethnic distinctions; I put forward that this aspect should lead them to 
be known as “fundamental ethnic identities”.  Examining how ethnic identities affect ethnic 
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conflicts should be considered indisputably necessary; such an exploration would bring 
valuable insight into an element which could influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts. 
Therefore, there is a need to ascertain the influence of fundamental, as well as non-
fundamental, ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. Moreover, I propose that 
particular elements of ethnic group similarity and levels of differences between ethnic 
groups should also be explored for their potential impact on ethnic conflict intensity. This 
study, thus, will be examining the effects that identities, in this case of the ethnic kind, 
might have on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. It is important to note that although the 
literature on the potential influence of ethnic identities on conflicts is not bear, it is, at the 
same time, far from being systematic and often flawed. This thesis seeks to shine a new 
light on the phenomenon and attempt to correct unsound theoretical conceptions of 
ethnicity. 
This study will be structured into four main chapters. The first will examine the 
academic literature which has concentrated on ethnic conflicts. It will present the manner 
that the notion of ethnic conflicts has been conceptualized. It will also display the factors 
which the literature has deemed to be causes of ethnic conflicts, as well as the variables 
which have been reckoned to impact the intensity of ethnic conflicts. The following chapter 
will bring forth the theory on ethnic identity, which I developed, that will form the basis for 
this study. It will also examine the attempts which have been made to isolate the impact of 
ethnic identity on conflict. The second chapter will also elaborate a series of questions and 
hypotheses which will be the framework for the following research. The third chapter, for 
its part, will lay forth the research design and methodological framework of the empirical 
work that will be undertaken. Finally, our last chapter will present and examine the results 
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of our statistical analyses. The fourth chapter will also explore the significance of the 
results and their contribution to the understanding of ethnic conflicts.  
In the following series of chapters, I will explore the important notions related to 
ethnic conflicts and examine the influence of one specific element, ethnic identity, on such 
conflicts; this will all be done in an attempt to bring a greater understanding to a complex 
and important phenomenon which threatens millions throughout the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1 
Ethnic Conflict Literature Review  
Ethnic conflicts have garnered much interest from researchers and academics. This 
phenomenon has notably been the result of an increase in the number of conflicts of an 
ethnic nature which have been signalled in recent times. These studies hold a twofold 
purpose. They, firstly, seek to inquire and explain the causes and functioning of ethnic 
conflicts; and they also, ultimately, attempt to find resolutions in order to end or control 
these disastrous manifestations of ethnic tensions.  
This chapter seeks to review the literature on ethnic conflicts. It examines how ethnic 
conflicts have been perceived and explained through the academic literature. It is organized 
into five main sections: the definition of ethnic conflicts, ethnic identity and ethnic groups, 
the causes of ethnic conflicts, the variables that influence ethnic conflicts, and a conclusion. 
Furthermore, this chapter also seeks to highlight the merits and failings of the existing 
literature on ethnic identities and conflicts. Its goal is to identify elements that are lacking 
or unclear in the literature and which would be important in the understanding of ethnic 
conflicts. 
Defining Ethnic Conflicts 
Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of ethnic conflicts, it is, initially, extremely 
important to understand what is meant by the term “ethnic conflict”. The notion of ethnic 
conflict is often employed to describe a great variety of conflicts; and can, thus, lead to an 
unclear and ambiguous understanding of the notion itself. Hence, it is important to define 
what is meant when referring to an ethnic conflict. 
At the outset, to properly understand ethnic conflicts, it is essential to comprehend the 
factors that compose it. Thus, it is, firstly, crucial to understand what a conflict represents. 
It is imperative to realize that conflicts arise from a difference between individuals or 
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groups in regards to goals. As Coser (1956) defines it, a conflict is a struggle in the hope of 
winning objectives by neutralizing, injuring or eliminating rivals. Hence, conflicts can be 
explained as a pursuit of incompatible goals by two or more parties leading to a 
confrontation of a varying degree that can range from simple tensions to all out violent 
clashes.   
Conflicts, thus, arise from a dysfunctional, or at the very least problematic, situation. 
However, the conflict itself can have a therapeutic quality by playing a remediating 
functionality in society (Bourdieu 1962; Oberschall 1973). The outcome of the conflict will 
remediate the dysfunction that initially led to the conflict in the first place. Boulding (1945, 
p. 240) further adds to this notion by asserting that a “conflict conducted in a decent and 
responsible manner is essential to any form of progress”. Although, conflicts represent an 
unquestionable source of negative consequences, the ultimate outcome can be seen as being 
positive. 
In relation to ethnic conflicts, conflicts can, thus, simply be construed as conflicts 
involving parties distinguished by ethnicity. Nevertheless, I would like to venture that, to 
be categorized as an ethnic conflict, it is not necessary for the contradicting goals to 
themselves be centered on ethnicity; the vital element should be that the groups themselves 
are divided along clear ethnic lines.  
However, there should be one exception to this rule. Struggles for decolonization, 
although most often involving clear ethnic distinctions (notably race), should not be 
considered ethnic conflicts because of the lack of an important element related to them: 
territoriality. I would advance that the concept of territory also plays a quintessential role in 
ethnic identities (Goffman 1963; Stea 1965; Sommer 1966; Lyman & Scott 1967; Becker 
1973). In a decolonization conflict, there is a lack of territorial attachment from one of the 
9 
 
parties; and, hence, this type of conflict should be excluded from being classified in the 
ethnic conflict category. 
Ethnic conflicts have, thus, been defined as a confrontation of parties with 
incompatible goals that are distinguished along ethnic lines and where both parties have a 
territorial attachment to the zone in conflict. This definition does not, unfortunately, permit 
a full understanding of the phenomenon. It is incomplete because only half of the 
phenomenon is fully described. In consequence, although conflicts have correctly been 
defined, to ascertain a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, it is also 
important to properly examine the notion of ethnicity. 
Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups 
Having previously exposed the essential nature of conflicts, this section sets out to 
explain the notion of ethnicity. It seeks to detail the purpose and function of ethnic identity 
and how it is rendered salient in individuals and groups. 
Ethnicity can simply be explained as a group identity. The concept of group identity 
is simply the identity that is shared by a group of individuals. It is the set of values shared 
by all members of a specific group. De Levita (1965) describes it as the constant features of 
a group in spite of the fact that the members of the group vary and change. It is “like any 
other identity… a collective sense of social belonging and ultimate loyalty related to 
parentage and a belief in common origins” (De Vos & Romanucci-Ross 1995, p.  350). 
A fundamental notion in the concept of group identity is its necessity of comparison 
in order to exist. Strauss (1959) brings forth that the constitution of any human group is 
other groups. In order to exist, a group, and therefore its identity, needs to be different from 
another group, yet it also needs to compare itself to another group.  
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Another key aspect of ethnicity is that it is essentially subjective (De Vos & 
Romanucci-Ross 1995). There is no “real” attachment to identity. This is an important 
element of ethnic identity which is characterized by Anderson (1991) as being essentially 
nothing more than “imagined communities”. Although the affiliation of the individual 
towards the ethnic group is real, the link itself does not exist. The latter point is further 
developed by Romanucci-Ross & De Vos’ description of ethnicity (1995, p. 13) as a 
“subjective sense of loyalty based on imagined origins and parentage rather than something 
to be measured by objectively present criteria or historical facts”. An example of such a 
phenomenon would be an individual who relates to an ethnic group by claiming some sort 
of distant lineage, although there might not be any substantive evidence of such ancestry.  
A further main feature of ethnic identity is that it can be like a matryoshka doll. 
Ethnic identities can be assumed from a spectrum that ranges from a micro to a macro 
level; and this process can be done without generating an internal conflict. Roosens (1995) 
identifies this phenomenon as “layering” of the ethnic structure. Individuals possess a 
multitude of identities, including multiple ethnic identities. The individual assumes an 
ethnic identity in regards to the best perceived possibility of maximizing results for himself 
(Barth 1969). The individual can, thus, have the ability to pick an ethnic identity that best 
suits his goals. Hence, it is through this process, which is influenced by particular 
situations, that ethnic identity becomes salient. 
An additional, and final, principal aspect of ethnicity revolves around the intrinsic 
emotional connections which are attached to ethnicity. This is a feature of ethnicity that, 
according to Connor (1994), is often badly underestimated. It is the emotional depth of 
ethnonational identity that renders it volatile and, thus, dangerous. The emotional 
attachments of ethnicity are seen as the reason why “ethnicity can be very negative and 
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destructive in its intent” (De Vos 1995, p.43). Furthermore, as has been demonstrated, 
seeing that conflicts are caused by differences amongst groups, these differences can result 
in discrimination and prejudice between the groups (Van Dijk 1987; Essed 1991). The 
discrimination and prejudice which result from the differences amongst ethnic groups, 
subsequently, lead to enhancing ethnic emotional attachments. Hence, it is these emotional 
attachments that render ethnic conflicts more threatening than other group identities 
(Romanucci-Ross & De Vos 1995).  
Ethnicity can, therefore, be summed up as a dynamic and malleable group identity 
that is based on perceived values and connections which become salient in an individual 
and group in a given situation and that has an intrinsic emotion to it which renders it more 
dangerous than other group identities.  
Causes of Ethnic Conflicts 
The previous sections explored the concept of ethnic conflicts. It is, thus, now 
valuable to turn to and examine the factors which cause ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts, 
and their destructive potential, do not simply come about. This section, therefore, seeks to 
enumerate factors which lead ethnic groups to enter into a state of conflict.  
In attempting to identify the particular cause of a conflict, the literature demonstrates 
it is often impossible. This impracticality seems to come from the fact that conflicts cannot 
normally be associated to one single causal variable (Sorokin 1962). Consequently, in 
analyzing the causes of ethnic conflicts, it is important to keep in mind, as it will be 
demonstrated, the complexity of situations involving ethnic conflicts.  
 Much research has been devoted to identifying and understanding elements which 
provoke conflicts. One of these factors might very well be humans’ own natural 
predisposition. Conflicts have been presented as being innate to all social animals (Ardrey 
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1966; Lorenz 1969). Sociological functions and psychological drives, manifested through 
natural selection and related to survival, lead individuals and groups to engage in conflicts 
and wars (Wright 1964; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). However, some researchers refute this 
assertion of normality of conflict and contend, rather, that conflict is an abnormal situation 
and that, instead, cooperation between individuals and groups represents the normality in 
their relationships (Parsons 1951; Smelser 1962; Johnson 1966).  
The literature also presents more concrete factors which lead to the development of 
conflicts. The literature actually reveals that the most important cause of ethnic conflicts 
seems to be competition. The struggle for economic and political resources is generally 
utilized to explain the start and perseverance of conflicts (Horowitz 1985; Rogers & Dando 
1992). It is the competition amongst different groups to attain incompatible goals which 
lead such groups to enter into conflict. Many negative consequences arise from the 
competitive struggles between groups: social categorization (Tajfel & Turner 1979), 
outgroup rejection (Coser 1956; Brewer 1979), out-group discrimination (Dustin & Davis 
1970; Bettencourt et al. 1992), the preference of autocratic leadership (Blake & Mouton 
1964; Sherif et al. 1961), and politicization (Rothchild 1986). These negative consequences 
all arise in an attempt to achieve or maintain an advantage over adversarial groups. 
However, competition also has another important effect on ethnic conflicts; it helps to 
increase group cohesion and reinforces group identity (Rothchild 1986; Posen 1993). It is 
the strengthened group cohesion and group identity which further reinforces the 
psychological divides between the conflicting parties. The emphasis on competition to 
explain the causes of ethnic conflicts, and all other conflicts, stresses groups’ willingness to 
fight each other in order to attain divergent goals. Therefore, it has been suggested that 
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ethnic groups struggle against one another for something that they have and want to keep or 
to attain something that they are blocked from obtaining. 
Although the literature tends to emphasize the role of competition on the onset of 
ethnic conflicts, it is important to underline that this competition is the result of problematic 
situations associated with economic and political factors. The economy has been singled 
out as a significant determinant of ethnic conflicts. The theory behind this notion is that 
periods of economic difficulty lead to conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler 2002; Fearon & Laitin 
2003; Miguel et al. 2004). However, others reject the straightforward link between the 
economic situation of groups and conflict (Boulding 1945; Sorokin 1962). Political factors 
have also been presented as causing the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. The literature 
demonstrates that political situations can be manipulated by individuals in the hopes of 
obtaining a gain. Elites in society can utilize, or even create, tensions to serve their own 
political interests (Brass 1985; Rothchild 1986; Saideman 1997; Soeters 2005). The 
political manipulation of contextual situations in an opportunistic manner is seen as being 
able to generate or reinforce conflicts. One way in which these manipulative political 
manoeuvres can lead to ethnic conflicts is through the explicit discrimination against out-
groups (Fox 2003) 
Differences in military capabilities are also seen as a cause of conflict. The balance of 
power can play a crucial role in keeping groups from entering into conflicts. It does so by 
controlling the fear that can develop in opposing groups. Fear tends to arise in a situation 
which is perceived to be unbalanced or unequal (Richardson 1960). The balance of power 
can, thus, strongly influence the degeneration of conflicts into violence (Wright 1935; 
Wehr 1979). When a situation is no longer balanced along an acceptable power 
distribution, a sense of fear can develop in one of the camps, pushing that party towards an 
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attempt to re-balance the situation. This attempt at re-balancing relations of power between 
groups can lead to an escalation of hostilities which, in turn, may itself very easily lead to 
direct open conflict between the groups (Jervis 1978; Posen 1993). 
The structure in which a given situation is managed also plays a noteworthy role in 
the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. Wehr (1979) points out that leftist ideologues such as 
Marx, Lenin and Mao concentrated on the class structure of a society to explain conflicts. 
However, structural impacts go far beyond social class. Some aspects of structural impact 
extend to the political structure of the country. The level of freedom, through a democracy-
autocracy continuum, has been demonstrated to influence the outset of ethnic conflicts 
(Gurr 1993a; Lindström & Moore 1995; Davis & Moore 1997; Esty et al.1999). The legal 
system has also been presented as leading to the generation of tensions. Wright (1935) 
refers to an improper legal system as a main cause of war. A legal system which is unable 
to confront and deal with tensions in a perceivably just manner will see those tensions 
escalate. The international system as a structure has also been brought forth as being a 
determinant on the onset of conflict. The argument is derived from the international 
system’s inabilities to properly and successfully deal with international and intranational 
tensions (Wright 1935; Boulding 1945; Lund 1996; Ramsbotham et al. 2005). However, 
within the structuralist and internationalist calls for change, it is important to note that those 
changes have to be properly installed because rapid and improper change and 
transformation of a given situation may actually risk enflaming existing conflicts or, even, 
creating new ones (Sorokin 1962; Wright 1964). Thus, the effects of change can be seen as 
a further cause which can lead to conflicts. 
The international context can also provoke the development of ethnic conflicts 
through contagion. Ethnic conflicts have been demonstrated to jump across borders and 
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spread to neighbouring countries (Lindström & Moore 1995; Fox 2000a; Saideman & 
Ayres 2000; Cetinyan 2002). Therefore, ongoing conflicts in one area can cause the onset 
of conflict in neighbouring areas; rendering the phenomenon of conflict contagion a 
possible cause of conflict. 
It is worth highlighting that none of the factors which have been presented as 
potential causes of ethnic conflicts are specific to conflicts of an ethnic nature. Rather, they 
are causal characteristics that can be applied to all types of conflicts. Therefore, it is fair to 
assert that ethnic conflicts do not seem to possess causes which are particular to them.   
As a summary of the causes of conflicts, one must underscore the difficulty to isolate 
just one factor as the sole source of conflicts. Thus, a full understanding of the causes of a 
conflict needs to have a multifaceted dimension. Gilliland (1995) reminds that it is 
important not to oversimplify the important roles that complex social, cultural and 
psychological phenomena play in conflict situation. Wright (1935, p.1) explains this 
complexity in an almost cynical realization: “the absence of conditions of peace is the 
cause of war”. Hence, in attempting to isolate the cause of an ethnic conflict it is important 
to keep in mind the complexity of the situation and realize that there might be an 
interaction of multiple causes at hand. 
Influences on Ethnic Conflicts  
After examining elements which lead to a state of conflict between groups, it is 
important to explore variables which influence the intensity of conflicts. These are factors 
which can influence the dynamics of ethnic conflicts and lead them to become more violent 
and last longer. Therefore, the aspects which will be presented in this section do not lead to 
the onset of conflicts, they only affect the severity of situations which are already in an 
existing state of conflict. 
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Initially it is worth stating that the factors which influence the dynamics of ethnic 
conflicts might not be from the present. Events which happened in the past can have an 
effect on ethnic conflicts. This is an important element of the primordialist perspective 
which states that past attachments and events can resurface and lead to the mobilization of 
groups against each other (Geertz 1963; Isaacs 1975; Smith 1981). However, a more 
concrete, and somewhat less primordialist perspective, of the past is related to autonomy. 
The fact that a group had experienced a greater amount of autonomy in the past will 
positively affect the dynamics of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Fox 1997, 2000b; Ayres & 
Saideman 2000). This historical factor will contribute to an increased intensity of ethnic 
conflict. 
Differences in economic and political resources also greatly impact ethnic conflicts. 
Probably the most important influences on conflicts relate to economic factors. Economic 
variables are not only important in causing the onset of conflicts, but they also influence the 
dynamics while groups are in a state of conflict. Several economic variables have been 
enumerated in the literature as having an impact on ongoing ethnic conflicts. Economic 
differences between ethnic groups in conflicts, for example, will play a role on the 
dynamics of conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Also, economic 
discrimination of a group from a different ethnicity will positively influence the intensity of 
such conflicts (Gurr 1993b; Cetinyan 2002). Furthermore, the level of economic 
development has also been shown to impact ongoing conflicts (Miller 1995; Davis and 
Moore 1997; Cetinyan 2002; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Political factors have also been 
mentioned as elements which affect ethnic conflicts. Differences in political resources, as 
in the case of economic differences, positively influence the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. 
(Gurr 1993a, 1993b; Cetinyan 2002; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Moreover, political 
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discrimination has also been demonstrated to positively affect ethnic conflicts (Gurr 
1993b). Another important political factor which influences the intensity of ethnic conflicts 
relates to the political system in place in countries affected by conflict. The level of 
freedom of the political context, measured through a democracy-autocracy continuum1, has 
been demonstrated to induce higher intensity in ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Lindström & 
Moore 1995; Davis & Moore 1997; Esty et al.1999).  
Furthermore, exterior factors have also been shown to impact the gravity of ethnic 
conflicts. Foreign actors can influence group dilemmas by giving political and military 
support to ethnic groups in conflict (Davis & Moore 1997; Fox 2000a, 2001). International 
support reinforces these groups, which leads to changes in the power structures of the 
conflict. Also, international support might be specifically provided through kin, groups of 
the same ethnic stock. This type of support provided by kinfolk who support related groups 
in other countries positively influences, as well, the degree of harshness of such conflicts 
(Saideman & Ayres 2000). 
Demographic factors have also been presented as important elements for the level of 
intensity of conflicts. The level of diversity of the country, whether it is more ethnically 
homogenous or heterogeneous, can positively impact the intensity of ethnic conflicts 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003). Furthermore, demographic factors specifically related to the ethnic 
groups can also influence conflicts. The relative size of the group has been shown to be a 
determining factor in the intensity of the conflict (Ayres & Saideman 2000). Another such 
aspect related to the ethnic groups is the level of cohesion of the group. Ethnic group 
cohesion, the number of organizations and individuals who represent the ethnic group and 
the level of support which they have from amongst the ethnic group members, has been 
                                                            
1 Gurr & Moore (1997) indicate that such measures actually evaluate political repression. 
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demonstrated to positively influence ethnic conflicts (Fox 1999, 2000b). Furthermore, 
cultural differences between groups have also been presented as determinants which will 
positively affect the intensity of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Fox 2000a). Once again, it is 
important to keep in mind, as with the causes of ethnic conflicts, that such conflicts do not 
possess a single factor of influence which determines their intensity; these are factors which 
are, once more, non-exclusive to ethnic conflicts. Influence, thus, must also be examined in 
a multifaceted perspective because ethnic conflicts are complex social, cultural and 
psychological phenomena. 
Summary of the Literature on Ethnic Conflicts and its Important Gaps 
After examining the academic literature which focuses on ethnic conflicts, this 
section seeks to present a summary of the processes which lead to the development of 
conflicts, ethnicity and, thus, ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, the major causes that lead to the 
onset of ethnic conflicts along with important variables which influence the intensity of 
ethnic conflicts are also briefly summarized. This section will also bring forth a major gap 
which exists in the ethnic conflict literature relating to the influence of ethnic identities on 
conflicts. This relationship has not been properly ascertained and, moreover, we propose 
that the void in the literature is mostly due to the fact that the parameters of ethnicity have 
not been properly defined. 
The literature clearly delineates a conflict as being parties with incompatible goals 
which enter into confrontation in order to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals and, thus, 
achieve their desired goal. Ethnicity is described as a group identity established around a 
set of common values shared by all of its members. Thus, an ethnic identity is simply a sub-
set of group identity that focuses on ethnic elements and is compared to other ethnic 
groups. It is the ethnic elements of the group which distinguishes it from other ethnic 
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groups. Hence, it can be supposed that if ethnicity is based on identity then ethnic conflicts 
can be defined as conflicts between different identities and that these identities focus on 
ethnic elements. Therefore, an ethnic conflict is determined as involving groups, who are 
attached to a common territory, with incompatible goals distinguished by different sets of 
common group values which form the focal point of their different ethnic identities. The 
examination of the literature on ethnic conflicts also brings forth the importance of the 
emotional attachments which are involved in ethnic conflicts. However, although the 
emotional impact of ethnicity has been examined, the literature seems to lack an in-depth 
analysis of the influence of the emotional attachments of ethnic identities.  
Upon examination of the causes of ethnic conflicts, the main origin of such conflicts 
appears to be competition. The struggle for political and economic resources is what is 
generally utilized to explain the causes of ethnic conflicts. However, an array of other 
variables is also employed as causes of ethnic conflicts. The literature clearly points out 
that it is almost impossible to isolate just one variable which is the cause of an ethnic 
conflict. Thus, ethnic conflicts should be seen as a multifaceted phenomenon with 
competition as the main cause of ethnic conflicts and with other variables as contributing 
causes to such conflicts. The literature places much emphasis on examining factors which 
can account for direct or contributing causes of ethnic conflicts. This can easily be 
understood because it is through the isolation of causal variables which lead to the onset of 
ethnic conflicts that, subsequently, remediation for theses triggering factors of conflict can 
be found and, thus, a resolution can be ultimately brought to the conflict. 
However, many other variables which cannot be considered as causes of ethnic 
conflicts play an important role on ethnic conflicts. These variables influence the level of 
intensity of ethnic conflicts. Such phenomena do not seem to receive the same attention as 
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causes of ethnic conflicts. If the literature demonstrates that there are variables which are 
perceived to lead groups into a state of ethnic conflicts, it is also critical to examine the 
variables which affect the intensity of ethnic conflicts.  
The literature presents a myriad of variables which can impact the strength of an 
ethnic conflict. However, I would like to draw attention to a neglected variable; I would 
like to emphasize ethnic identity. The literature demonstrates that research into the effect of 
cultural differences, which include ethnic identities, on ethnic conflicts has been conducted. 
Nevertheless, such research does not permit to give a complete picture of the influence of 
such differences on ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, these studies do not specifically 
concentrate on ethnic identity differences. A more thorough examination of specific 
identities which make up ethnic groups that are involved in confrontations could lead to a 
greater understanding of the ethnic conflict phenomenon. Can it be that different types of 
ethnic identities influence ethnic conflicts differently? What are the effects of different 
types of ethnic identities on the levels of intensity of ethnic conflicts? What are the results 
of comparing different ethnic identities in order to isolate their impact on ethnic conflict 
volatility? This is a line of research which can greatly contribute to the further 
comprehension of ethnic conflicts. It is the direction which will, subsequently, be the 
framework for this study.  
As has been exposed, there is a great gap in the study of ethnic conflicts in relation to 
the influence on conflicts of identities which form the focal point of ethnicities. This 
situation is mostly due, I believe, to improper definitions of variables which form ethnicity. 
Ethnic categories and ethnicity are often interchangeable and compared to each other; 
rendering a true definition of ethnicity problematic. To resolve this problem, I offer the 
argument that ethnicity should be regarded as an umbrella notion which refers to all group 
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identities that revolve around ethnic elements. In other words, ethnicity should not be seen 
as a group identity, but rather as a category of group identities; unless it is compared to 
non-ethnic group identities.  
Furthermore, to get a better grasp of the influence of ethnic identities on ethnic 
conflicts, there must be a proper categorization of ethnic identities. I share Sambanis’ 
reasoning (2001) about the importance of highlighting three specific ethnic identities: 
religion, language and race. I would also like to advance that these three identities should 
be referred to as fundamental ethnic identities. Individuals and groups can be divided into 
an infinity of partitions. However, I suggest that it is only religion, language and race which 
are the fundamental divisions of ethnicity and which can, thus, truly be considered as 
undeniable.  
The literature demonstrates, as Sambanis (2001) points out, and to the best of my 
knowledge, a lack of proper comparisons between these three identities. Hence, there is a 
need to accurately evaluate the potential influence of ethnic identities on the volatility of 
ethnic conflicts. It is my belief that there is a necessity to better understand how these three 
ethnic identities influence ethnic conflicts. Isolating the influence of fundamental ethnic 
identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts will be the basis of this study. The aim of this 
research is, therefore, to attempt to contribute to a void in the literature.  
The following chapter will focus on the categorization of ethnicity and, also, present 
the hypotheses which will form the basis of this study.  
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 
The Impact of Ethnic Identities on Conflict 
The previous chapter explored the concepts which form ethnic conflict. It also 
presented factors which are perceived to lead to conflicts. These are causes which create a 
state of conflict. The previous chapter, in addition, explored variables which are perceived 
to accentuate or diminish the intensity of ethnic conflicts. It is important to note that the 
latter factors do not lead to a state of conflict, it is the former factors which do so; the latter 
factors influence situations which are already in a state of conflict. 
Ethnic groups who have become entangled in a state of conflict can be affected by 
multiple factors. These variables influence the dynamics of the conflict between the groups. 
Researchers have attempted to isolate the impact of specific elements of the interaction 
between different ethnic groups in conflict. One such factor that I have highlighted for its 
potential effect on ethnic conflicts relates to the ethnic identities of the groups. There have 
been attempts to examine the impact of ethnicity on conflicts; however, I believe, that these 
ethnic categories have suffered from improper categorization parameters which have 
negatively affected comparisons.  
The following chapter examines studies which have undertaken a comparative 
examination along ethnic lines and lays forth how ethnic categories have so far been 
compared in the ethnic conflict literature. It will also propose a new categorization method 
for ethnic identities and will also present an in-depth analysis of these categories of 
ethnicity. Lastly, this chapter will present hypotheses which will be the framework of the 
ensuing study. These hypotheses will examine the influence of the proposed categories of 
ethnic identities on conflict intensity. 
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Comparisons between Ethnic Identities  
The literature is ripe with studies that have attempted to identify which specific group 
identities have a more significant effect on group conflict. Some of these comparisons have 
not been based on ethnicity (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997; Fox 2002; Fearon & Laitin 
2003). However, others have discussed the dilemma in a more ethnicity prone perspective. 
The effect of ethnic identities has been studied on electoral outcomes, but with ethnic 
categories compared to social class (De Jong 1956; Lipset 1960; Lijphart 1979). It is also 
noteworthy to mention that the aforementioned studies utilized the religious and linguistics 
identities of ethnicity.  
Still, there have been attempts to define clear categories of ethnicity. However, the 
categorization of ethnicity has sometimes been confusing and unclear. Some studies divide 
conflicts into comparison between ethnicity and ethnic variables (Smith 1981; Henderson 
1997). Such a categorization goes against our definition of ethnicity as an umbrella to all 
ethnic groups and seemingly leads to confusion. Gurr (1993a, 1993b) attempts to categorize 
ethnic conflicts into specific categories which will allow for an in-depth comparison of 
different conflicts. However, his types of ethnic groups are somewhat confusing and do not 
seem to have a clear cut ethnic distinction between them but seem, rather, more determined 
by the specific goals of the groups. Soeters (2005) is more successful in defining true ethnic 
breakdowns of ethnic groups by ascertaining that they can be categorized into four 
groupings: race, religion, region and record. These categories showcase more of the ethnic 
divide of the groups, what their connection is based on. However, I believe, the region and 
record categories are problematic because they are still not distinct enough to avoid a group 
being entered into two different categories. I believe that such a standard of division for 
ethnic groups and conflicts is attained by Sambanis (2001). He underlines the importance 
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clean ethnic distinctions and proposes studying the subject by comparing the ethnic 
identities of religion, language and race.  
As I have already stated, I agree with Sambanis’ argument and add that these three 
identities should be known as the fundamental identities of ethnicity because of what I 
believe is the undeniable nature of these identities. To underline, I bring forth that these 
three identities form the fundamental bases of ethnicity. They are the three true ways of 
accurately distinguishing ethnic groups: religious beliefs, languages spoken and racial 
features. There can be no mistaking in a distinction along these three ethnic identities; 
unlike others. One can confuse a Canadian from an American, or an Albertan from an 
Ontarian. But it is much harder to confuse a Muslim from a Christian, a Francophone from 
an Anglophone or an East Asian from a Black person. Furthermore, I propose that ethnic 
identities which cannot be classified in either of these three categories, tribe and region for 
example, should be defined as non-fundamental ethnic identities. 
Fundamental Ethnic Identities 
The role of these three identities on conflicts has been examined, mostly separately, 
in the literature. Hence, the following section will expose how each of the three 
fundamental ethnic identities has been presented in other studies. This section will detail 
the manner which these three fundamental ethnic identities have been shown to influence 
individuals and groups who are identified to them. 
Religion 
Religion is one of the most uniting and divisive elements of our lives. It can have 
undertones in all aspects of society. The literature demonstrates that religion has an 
important role in conflicts. Fox (1999) states that religion serves four basic functions in 
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relation to conflict: it provides a value-laden belief system; it supplies standards and criteria 
of behaviour based on that belief system; it organizes adherents through its institutions; and 
it legitimizes actors, actions and institutions. Isaacs (1975) even goes so far as to ascertain 
that religion appears in every conflict. Religion is even seen as being impossible to totally 
separate from nationalism (Fox 2003). There even seems to be an increasing attention 
directed to religious elements of conflicts. Fox (2004) underlines this importance by 
demonstrating that the influence of religion on conflicts has been growing; which has also 
led to an increase in religious conflicts over the past decades. Fox (1997; 2000a, 2003) also 
emphasizes that religious conflicts differ from other types of conflicts involving other 
ethnic groups.   
This difference is mostly due to the fact that religious conflicts possess an important 
emotional factor which is connected to religious beliefs. The relevance of religion in a 
conflict is through emotion, more specifically passion, and this emotional surfacing is 
directly caused by the fact that the beliefs, along with the relationship to God, of an 
individual and a group are attacked (Isaacs 1975; Fox 2000b). This is why, as McTernan 
(2003) puts it, religion justifies violence. There is a strong sentiment attached to belief and 
religion, any attack or menace, real or perceived, to those beliefs unleashes an emotional, 
passionate reaction. In a religious conflict it is those strong bonds and beliefs that confront 
each other for the supremacy of belief and community.  
Language 
Language represents an important attachment for groups. Language often serves as 
one of the most important symbols of identification and distinction (Das Gupta 1970). It is 
a means of communication which easily distinguishes individuals into appropriate groups. 
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Language is, thus, as Harrel (1995) describes it, an easy and strong ethnic marker when 
compared to others elements of division. This factor notably creates “strong emotional-
cultural attachments to mother tongues, readily generated into political cleavages and 
leading to murderous violence” (Isaacs 1975, p.103).  Liebkind (1982) further points out 
that linguistic groups utilize divergence as a strategy to explicitly communicate pride in 
one’s own linguistic group. This linguistic pride also serves to counter pressures of 
assimilation (Laitin 2000a). The fears related to assimilation conger up a strong emotional 
reaction because if the group is assimilated there is a loss of group identity and, hence, of 
the group itself. Thus, preserving linguistic identity becomes a fight for survival. 
However, language does suffer from an emotional weakness. The main issue with 
linguistic identification is that language in itself it is not necessary for linguistic identity 
(Isaacs 1975; Laitin 2000b). This weakness in the emotional connection leaves it vulnerable 
to what Edwards (1992) calls a “language shift”. Individuals can change linguistic 
identification and, hence, change linguistic identity. For this reason, I can ascertain that 
language is the easiest of the three identities examined to change. One would have to try 
very hard to change racial groups, and changing religion demands a deep spiritual 
introspection and emotional sacrifice; but it is much easier to learn another language, or 
even to make another language one’s dominant linguistic identifier. Although linguistic 
identity can be considered the easiest of the fundamental ethnic identities to change, it is 
important to note that individuals do have a deep attachment to their language and such a 
decision does come will complex implications which are influenced by multiple factors 
(Laitin 1992). 
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Race 
Racial difference represents the easiest form of distinction to identify between 
humans. It can be seen as the most fateful group demarcation in history (Merelman 1994). 
Race plays an important part in the lives of individuals, especially if they live in multi-
racial societies. Racial membership has an undeniable importance because individuals will 
take into consideration racial interests in their decision-making process (Philpot 2004). It is, 
thus, easily understandable to realize how physical racial demarcations make up an 
important element in social relations. However, in terms of race and conflict, the literature 
seems to lack much work on the issue. One of the reasons that this type of literature is so 
poor is emphasized by Reynal-Querol. She believes that “the literature that studies the 
ethnic causes of social conflict has limited ethnicity to linguistic fragmentation and, in 
some cases, to religious fragmentation” (2002, p.42). Therefore, a greater understanding of 
how racial distinction may affect ethnic conflicts, as the subsequent study will attempt to 
do, will be a welcomed contribution to the literature on ethnic conflicts. 
As has been presented, the fundamental ethnic identities represent a great potential 
for hostilities. However, there is an important gap in the study of ethnic conflicts in relation 
to the impact of the fundamental ethnic identities on conflicts. Most importantly, the three 
fundamental identities of ethnic conflicts have not been studied through a comparative 
manner with each other in order to identify their respective influence on the propensity of 
accentuating the intensity of ethnic conflicts.  
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Hypotheses 
Do ethnic conflicts have a determining difference due to the type of ethnic groups, 
hence the ethnic identities, involved in the conflict? 
This section will explore this query. It will express the questions and hypotheses 
which will be examined by this study. It is my belief that the best manner to compare 
different ethnic group conflicts is to categorize them in what I have described as 
fundamental ethnic identities. I have selected to measure the influence of the fundamental 
ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts – a measurement which is often utilized 
to measure (Gurr 1993a; Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997; Sambanis 2001; Reynal-Querol 
2002). This endeavour will be done through four questions. 
Which type of ethnic identity leads to a higher intensity in ethnic group conflicts? 
 In order to answer this question a comparison of the fundamental ethnic identities, 
religious, linguistic, and racial, along with non-fundamental ethnic identities will be 
conducted. The results should demonstrate which type of ethnic identity leads to more 
pronounced ethnic conflicts.  
Studies which have compared such identities have demonstrated that religion has a 
greater propensity to lead to more intense ethnic conflicts. In Fox’s comparison (2004) of 
religious conflicts to non-religious conflicts, he found that, although religious conflicts 
occurred less often than non-religious conflicts, religious conflicts were more intense. Seul 
(1999) also found that religion served identity impulses more powerfully than other 
constructs of identity. When compared to language, studies have tended to demonstrate that 
religion leads to more intense conflicts (Lijphart 1979; Henderson 1997; Reynal-Querol 
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2002). However, the results are not unanimous. Ellingsen (2000), for her part, showed that 
language has a greater impact on conflicts than religion. 
Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that the works which have attempted to compare 
different fundamental ethnic identities with each other have led to the indication that 
religion has a greater impact on ethnic conflicts. Studies have demonstrated that religion 
has a stronger emotional attachment which leads more often to a higher intensity in 
conflicts than the other fundamental ethnic identities. Hence, I believe that the results will 
show that ethnic conflicts based on religious identities will have a higher intensity than 
other types of ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, I believe that the literature has also shown a 
strong emotional attachment created by language. Thus, I predict that the results will place 
language based ethnic conflicts in second place. Finally, I deem that, although the literature 
on race and conflict is quite limited, racially based ethnic conflicts will come in third place 
ahead of non-fundamental identities. This assumption is based on the belief that race 
generates stronger emotional reactions compared to conflicts not based on a fundamental 
ethnic identity. I therefore propose the following hypothesis regarding the relative 
importance of these three factors. 
H1: The intensity of ethnic conflicts will be positively associated with, in declining 
order of importance, religion, language, race, and non-fundamental identities. 
Are conflicts between groups with multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences 
more prone to higher levels of intensity than conflicts with only one fundamental ethnic 
identity distinction?  
I will also seek to compare ethnic conflicts which are based on one fundamental 
ethnic identity with those which are based on multiple fundamental ethnic identities in 
30 
 
order to determine if the latter accentuates the level of intensity of ethnic conflicts. From 
what I could gather, there seems to be a void in the literature in reference to this subject. 
However, I believe that common sense leads one to presume that having to deal with 
multiple ethnic identities, hence multiple emotional connections, renders conflict more 
severe than ethnic conflicts based on a single fundamental ethnic identity. Therefore, I 
believe that the results will show support the following assertion:  
H2: Ethnic conflicts based on multiple fundamental ethnic identities have a higher 
intensity than ethnic conflicts based only on one fundamental ethnic identity. 
To further understand the effect of ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic 
conflicts, it is, I believe, important to extend this examination to the impact of particular 
sub-categories of ethnic identities. Two specific questions will follow this direction. 
Are sectarian religious conflicts prone to weaker levels of intensity than conflicts 
between religious identities from different major religions? 
Sectarian religious conflicts are religious conflicts which oppose groups from the 
same major religion: i.e., Catholics versus Protestants, Sunnis versus Shiites, etc. Non-
sectarian religious conflicts oppose groups from different major religions: i.e., Christians 
versus Jews, Muslims versus Hindus, etc. Drooger’s findings (2002) demonstrate that if 
conflicting groups are of the same religion there are better chances of finding common 
ground. I believe that this factor is due to the fact that there is, ultimately, a bond between 
groups of the same religion which limits emotional intensity, compared with non-sectarian 
religious conflicts, and that, therefore, this religious bond also possesses a greater ability to 
push groups to find a resolution. Thus, I believe that the results will indicate that: 
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H3: Sectarian religious conflicts are prone to lesser levels of intensity than non-
sectarian religious conflicts.  
Are linguistic ethnic conflicts between groups who share similar languages less 
intense than conflicts between groups with non-similar linguistic distinctions? 
 Similar languages are defined as languages that have linguistic similarities: i.e., 
Russian versus Ukrainian, Croatian versus Serbian, etc. Hence, non-similar languages are 
those which do not share any significant linguistic similarities: i.e., Turkish versus Greek, 
Azerbaijani versus Armenian, etc. One study has examined this exact same research 
question. Laitin (2000a) demonstrated that linguistic conflicts with more pronounced 
language differentiations exhibit less intensity. However, as it will be indicated in greater 
detail in the following chapter, I believe that there is a major concern with the methodology 
of that study which might have flawed the results in the reverse direction. I have, hence, 
decided not to base my projections on Laitin’s results. 
I, consequently, believe that language based ethnic conflicts share the same 
dimension as do religious ethnic conflicts in respect to similarity. Similar languages help to 
lead to better chances of finding common ground. This emotional impact should, hence, not 
be as strong in the similar category. Similar language groups can be seen as distant kin, 
which implies some sort of connection between the conflicting groups. Therefore, I 
estimate that the results will demonstrate that: 
H4: Linguistic conflicts implicating similar linguistic groups have a lower intensity 
than linguistic conflicts which do not share significant linguistic similarities. 
 The questions which have been presented in this section will not only be the 
framework of the subsequent study but will also permit to elaborate on the understanding of 
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the relationship between ethnic identities and conflicts and, thus, contribute to the literature 
on the matter. 
After having established the framework of the study in this chapter, the following 
chapter will present the methodological design of the empirical study.  
 
 
 
  
Chapter 3 
Research Design 
This chapter will present the methodological design of the empirical study. It is 
composed of three main sections: the methodology which will include the variables at the 
heart of the study; the datasets from which the data were garnered; and the statistical 
analyses which were performed on the data. 
Methodology 
In order to evaluate the relative influence of identities on conflict intensity, a 
comparative method was used. Hence, the study was a comparison of the three fundamental 
ethnic identities: religious, linguistic and racial. Conflicts with these identities were also 
compared to non-fundamental ethnic identities, and to groups in conflicts which possess 
multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences. Furthermore, the comparison was done 
through a large-N study. Having the largest possible sample for the study will enable the 
results to have a better chance of being applicable on a larger scale. 
The data were collected from two different datasets. The beneficial contribution of 
utilizing two different datasets, instead of just one, is to reinforce the implications of the 
results. Although the datasets are composed of different ethnic conflicts and labelled in 
different manners, if the aggregated results lead in the same directions in both cases, it can 
only emphasize the meaning and significance of the results. Furthermore, while there are 
added methodological complexities which might leave this study vulnerable to criticisms, 
similar results for both datasets would attenuate the validity of such criticisms and reinforce 
the importance of the study.   
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The core of the study was its variables. They were composed of three different sets of 
variables. Firstly, ethnic identities formed the independent variables of the study. Secondly, 
measures of the conflict intensity constituted the dependent variables. Lastly, a series of 
control variables served to isolate the influence of ethnic identities on conflicts.   
Ethnic Identities  
The objective of this study is to analyze the effects that different ethnic identities may 
have on the intensity of ethnic group conflicts. In order to evaluate this relationship, a series 
of ethnic conflicts was examined. The independent variables of this study consisted of five 
categories of ethnic identities, three fundamental ethnic identities (religion, language, and 
race), the non-fundamental ethnic identity category, and a category composed of ethnic 
conflicts involving multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences. These categories were 
defined as follows: 
• Religion: involves conflicts in which the protagonists are distinguished as belonging 
to different religious groups, whether from different major religions or not.   
• Language: contains conflicts which involve opposing parties that do not speak the 
same language. 
• Race: comprised of ethnic conflicts in which the groups are differentiated by a 
difference in the general physical traits of the group members.  
• Non-Fundamental: contains conflicts with groups that are differentiated by ethnic 
identities other than the three prior fundamental identities. Such examples are tribes 
and regions.  
• Multiple Identities: this category features conflicting groups which are differentiated 
by more than one fundamental ethnic identity. 
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Furthermore, three of the categories were divided into sub-categories for a more in-
depth analysis. The sub-divided categories were classified as follows:  
• The multiple identities category was divided into two sub-categories, respectively 
one composed of two fundamental ethnic differences and the other of three such 
identity distinctions. This will allow for a further examination into the possible 
impact of the amount of fundamental ethnic identity differences on conflicts.  
• The conflicts in the religion category were also split into two sub-categories in order 
to examine the possible effect that common religious values might have on ethnic 
conflicts. These two sub-categories were characterized as being sectarian, involving 
conflicts which have religious groups that can be considered as being divisions from 
the same major religion, or non-sectarian, composed of conflicts in which the 
protagonists are religious groups belonging to different major religions. 
• The language category was, as well, separated into two sub-categories. This was 
undertaken to study the effect that linguistic similarity of ethnic groups might have 
on ethnic tensions. These two sub-categories were defined as similar, composed of 
conflict involving groups that speak different languages but which have important 
linguistic similarities, or non-similar, formed of conflicting groups that speak 
different languages and which do not have important linguistic similarities. 
Conflict Intensity 
This study will seek to examine the influence of ethnic identities on levels of intensity 
in ethnic conflicts. The dependent variable was, hence, the intensity of the ethnic conflicts. 
The measures for the intensity of the conflicts were based on four different indicators from 
two different datasets.  
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Firstly, two variables provided by the Battle Deaths dataset (BD) were used. These 
variables are the number of battle deaths associated to each conflict and the number of 
years registered for each conflict. The first variable depicts the raw number of estimated 
registered deaths related to battle, with a minimum of 25, per year for each conflict 
examined. It is based on the battle dead best estimation variable of the BD dataset. The 
battle deaths were summed for each conflict and averaged on the total number of years 
registered to each conflict.2 Real numbers of deaths provide an interesting measure of the 
gravity, and deadliness, potential of the different identities. The second variable which will 
serve as a measure of intensity from the BD dataset is the number of registered years of the 
conflict, i.e. the number of years for which at least 25 deaths were estimated to have 
occurred. This measure, although not a regular conception of length, allows for an 
understanding into the potential persistence of each ethnic identity. 
 Secondly, two variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR) will also be 
utilized to measure intensity: protest and rebellion. It is important to note that these 
variables were captured in two temporal dimensions; over a quinquennial period and 
annually. The intensity of the conflicts was, firstly, measured through group protest 
activities. Two different indicators actually form this variable. The Quinquennial Protest 
Scores variable, which covers the period from 1945 to 1999 labelled as PROTI in the 
dataset, was utilized for periodic analyses, whereas the Annual Protest Scores variable, 
which covers the period from 1985 to 2000 labelled as PROT, is an annual measure of 
                                                            
2 It is important to note that the number of years registered for each conflict does not refer to the actual length 
of the conflict. Due to the minimal requirements of battle deaths and the availability of data, the cases do not 
necessarily have contiguous data for battle deaths; gaps in battle deaths estimations of conflicts are common 
features of the BD dataset. Therefore, a regular conception of registered length would not be plausible in this 
situation. 
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protest.3. Examining the protest activity of conflicts allows for the comprehension of non-
violent dynamics of ethnic conflicts. Protests are less intense, obviously, than violent 
conflicts; but they, however, still measure intensity in conflicts and are a good indicator of 
conflict gravity. Our second measure of intensity from MAR was the anti-regime rebellion 
activity of the conflicts. The Quinquennial Rebellion Scores variable, which covers the 
period from 1945 to 1999 and is labelled as REBEL, quantified the periodic rebellion 
intensity of the conflicts; while the Annual Rebellion Scores variable, which covers the 
period from 1985 to 2000 and is labelled as REB, measured the rebellion intensity in an 
annualised manner.  
All of these measures will serve as the dependent variables in the study of the 
influence of the different ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. 
Control Variables 
In an attempt to control for the influence of other variables on the relationship 
between our ethnic identities and the variables used to measure the intensity of the ethnic 
conflicts, five control variables were added to the linear regressions. This measure was only 
performed with the MAR dataset due to the availability of the variables. These elements 
were all established by prior studies to affect ethnic conflict dynamics. Thus, these control 
variables were able to identify the true influence of the ethnic identities on conflict 
intensity.  
 
 
                                                            
3 It is worth nothing that the MAR codebook for the version of the dataset used in this study contains an 
erratum. The PROTI and PROT variable labels are reversed. 
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Regime  
 The type of government which oversees the ethnic tension can play an important 
role on the dynamics of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Lindström & Moore 1995; Davis & 
Moore 1997; Esty et al. 1999). Therefore, a variable was used to examine the influence of 
regime types on ethnic conflicts. The data utilized to create this variable came from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2009).4 The specific data used was provided from the 
Revised Combined Polity Score variable, labelled as POLITY2. It is a modified version of 
the Combined Polity Score, labelled as POLITY. It facilitates the use of the POLITY 
regime measure in time-series analyses. The original variable, POLITY, is computed by 
subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score of the dataset; this process results 
in a unified polity scale. Seeing that the dataset has a temporal range of 1800 to 2007, the 
data beyond the temporal range needed, either 1945 to 1999 or 1985 to 2000, were, 
obviously, excluded. 
Lost Autonomy  
The historical situation of a group has also been found to influence ethnic conflicts. 
Groups who have had greater autonomy in the past have demonstrated to have more severe 
levels of conflict (Gurr 1993a; Ayres & Saideman 2000). In order to account for the 
possible impact of such historical situations, a variable reflecting past autonomy was 
employed. The Index of Political Autonomy Grievances Values was used to measure the 
influence of autonomy grievances. The variable is an index which is constructed by adding 
the weights from three other variables. The value is labelled as AUTLOST. 
 
                                                            
4 When using the MAR dataset, the data utilized to measure the influence of regime type is normally from the 
Polity datasets. 
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Group Concentration  
 Certain group factors have been demonstrated to heighten conflict. One such 
variable is group concentration. This demographic factor represents the spatial distribution 
of the group. Studies have shown that the more geographically concentrated a group is, the 
greater the intensity of a conflict (Ayres & Saideman 2000; Cetinyan 2002). Thus, to assays 
the effect of this factor, a variable reflecting the geographical concentration of the ethnic 
groups was used. This variable is labelled GROUPCON.  
Economic Differentials 
The difference in available economic resources has been indicated as accentuating the 
intensity of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Therefore, to control 
for the influence of economic differences between the groups in conflict, the Economic 
Differentials Index was utilized. This variable, which is labelled as ECDIFXX, is a 
composite scale, composed of six different economic factors of the MAR dataset, which 
measures economic inequalities amongst the conflicting groups.  
Political Differentials  
 Inequalities in the access to political resources can be a determinant of ethnic 
conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Cetinyan 2002; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Such political 
differences between the conflicting groups were measured with the Political Differentials 
Index, which is labelled as POLDIFXX. This variable is a composite variable scale formed 
by six different variables from the MAR dataset. 
Other factors have also been shown to accentuate conflicts but were not included as 
control variables in this study. Firstly, international military and political support (Davis & 
40 
 
Moore 1997; Fox 2000a; Saideman & Ayres 2000; Fox 2001) were excluded because 
correspondence with MAR personnel indicated that the support variables were originally 
coded on paper and were not integrated into the MAR database. However, they are 
currently working on integrating those variables with the latest MAR dataset. Secondly, 
contagion has also been shown to affect conflict intensity (Lindström & Moore 1995; Fox 
2000a; Saideman & Ayres 2000). The contagion variables, labelled separately as 
ICONREB for the rebellion variable and INCONPRO for the protest variable, were 
collected only from 1970 to 1995 and approximately only once per decade. They were thus 
excluded because the decennial periodic measure of these variables was not in line with the 
quinquennial period of the study and, also, the time frame of these variables was deemed to 
be too short for our study. Lastly, group cohesion has been found, as well, to increase 
intensity in ethnic group conflicts (Fox 1999, 2000b; Fox & Sandler 2003). The cohesion 
variable, labelled as COHESX, covers the period from 1980 to 1995. This variable had to 
also be excluded because it did not match the time frame of our study. 
It is important to highlight that all the variables used for the MAR dataset, both the 
measures and the controls, were converted into a 0 to 1 scale to allow for an appropriate 
comparison between the variables. 
Datasets 
The subsequent study used two different datasets as the sources of the data to be 
analyzed. These datasets, however, possess different forms of values: hard numbers for the 
death toll and the registered years associated with the BD dataset, and coded variables 
determined by the MAR researchers. It is, thus, important to divide the study into two 
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different analyses; one concentrated on the variables of the BD dataset, and the other on 
those of the MAR dataset.  
Battle Deaths Dataset 
The BD dataset sets forth to identify the number of death caused by conflicts. The 
project maintains a dataset on battle deaths, both for soldiers and civilians killed in combat, 
in state-based armed conflicts, both internal and external, for the period from 1946 to 2005. 
The actual dataset used for the analysis is the Battle Deaths Dataset version 2.0. This 
dataset gathers Lacina & Gleditsch’s data on battle deaths (2005) with the UCDP/PRIO 
dataset on armed conflicts. 
This dataset describes an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Lacina 
2006, p.4). It is important to note that the dataset only includes data on battle deaths if the 
estimate for the given year is at least 25 deaths. It also defines “battle deaths” as “deaths 
resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an 
armed conflict during contested combat. Contested combat is use of armed force by a party 
to an armed conflict against any person or target during which the perpetrator faces the 
immediate threat of lethal force being used by another party to the conflict against him/her 
and/or allied fighters. Contested combat excludes the sustained destruction of soldiers or 
civilians outside of the context of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g. execution of 
prisoners of war)” (Lacina 2006, p.5). It is, hence, important to note that this dataset only 
presents a specific category of conflict death, the actual estimated total of conflict deaths 
might be considerably higher (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). 
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The BD dataset includes data on a wide variety of internal and external conflicts. For 
our purposes, the BD dataset included two hundred sixty-nine conflicts.5 However, to 
properly utilize this dataset, the ethnic conflicts from the dataset had to be isolated from the 
non-ethnic conflicts. To do so, the two hundred sixty-nine conflicts were sorted by me into 
five categories:  
• Ethnic: conflicts which implicate groups that are clearly defined along ethnic lines. 
• Ideological: conflicts in which the main goal of the insurgent group is to change the 
political system in place. 
• Decolonization: the main goal of these conflicts is to achieve independence from a 
colonial power. Although these types of conflicts might be drawn along ethnic lines, 
often by race, I do not believe that these conflicts possess the same characteristics as 
regular ethnic conflicts, notably because there is no geographical interaction or 
proximity between the conflicting groups.  
• Elite/Military: the main purpose of these conflicts is to gain political power for 
individuals or factions. 
• Interstate Non-Ethnic: external conflicts between countries without an ethnic 
difference among the conflicting groups. 
 The classification of each conflict was done by me through an in depth research of 
each conflict to define which category best represents them.6 Furthermore, conflicts which 
                                                            
5 The dataset is said to actually have two hundred thirty-six conflicts (Harbom et al. 2008); however, many of 
the conflicts concentrate on the countries of conflict and aggregate protagonists together. For the purpose of 
this study, I preformed a triage of the conflicts to isolate similar group types and classify them together. This 
process resulted in an increase of the number of conflicts. 
6 I used internet searches to find encyclopaedic information from different trustworthy sources which allowed 
me to properly classify the conflicts. I did not keep a detailed inventory of each source utilized for each 
conflict; however, the most common examples were the World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html), and the Encarta Encyclopaedia 
(http://encarta.msn.com). Academic books and articles were also used to ascertain the nature of the conflicts 
examined.  
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are included in the dataset but do not have any available data in the battle dead best 
estimation category were removed. Only the conflicts in the ethnic conflict category were 
used in the study. This process resulted in eighty-five conflicts being retained. However, 
the conflict involving Bangladesh was removed from the analysis of ethnic conflicts 
because the number of deaths for that specific conflict which is registered in a one-year 
period, 50 000, was more than double any other averaged death toll and was an outlier 
skewing the results of the analyses. After this removal, there were eighty-four conflicts left 
in the ethnic conflict category. 
The conflicts which were categorized as ethnic conflicts were further classified into 
specific ethnic identity categories and sub-categories. I performed all of the classifications, 
except the linguistic distinctions, of the ethnic conflicts into the appropriate categories. The 
ethnic conflicts were classified into the five ethnic identity categories.7 Classification for 
the ethnic conflicts of the BD dataset was made as follows:  
• Religion: the protagonists in the conflicts were deemed to belong to different 
religious groups, whether from outside or inside the same religion. 
• Language: the conflicting parties were divided by linguistic differences. The 
distinction was made with the use of Ethnologue (Gordon 2005), an encyclopaedic 
type reference on the languages of the world. If the languages spoken by the 
conflicting groups were registered in Ethnologue as being different, they were 
classified as different.  
• Race: the conflict is between groups with different visible physical traits. Race was 
defined in a strict manner based on genetics and using differences in physical traits 
                                                            
7 The classification process of the ethnic conflicts was the same as the classification of the BD conflicts into 
their appropriate types. The same types of sources were utilized for this procedure for all the categories and 
sub-categories, except for the linguistic category. 
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as the distinction, and not on a more liberal interpretation of race that defines it 
along shared values. Furthermore, clear racial distinction along visible traits was 
necessary to be included in this category. If the literature deemed the groups to be 
racially different, along clear and distinct racial lines, then the conflicts were 
entered in this category. 
• Non-Fundamental: if the ethnic conflict cannot be categorized as belonging to any 
of the three fundamental ethnic identities, then it was classified as being of a non-
fundamental ethnic nature and entered in this category.  
• Multiple Identities: ethnic conflicts which were classified in more than one of the 
fundamental ethnic identity categories were also classified in this category. The 
multiple identities category was also separated into two sub-categories, one with 
two fundamental ethnic differences and the other with three. 
Moreover, the religion and language categories were also divided into sub-categories 
for an additional classification to allow for further analysis: 
• The Religion category was divided into two sub-categories based on sectarianism. 
Ethnic conflicts in which the protagonists are divided along sectarian groups from 
the same major religion were classified as sectarian and those which involve ethnic 
groups from different religions were categorized as non-sectarian.  
• The Language category was also separated into two sub-categories. Ethnic conflicts 
in which the groups speak different languages that belong to the same main branch 
of the same linguistic family according to the Ethnologue (Gordon 2005) reference 
on languages (ex: both languages belong to the Germanic branch of the Indo-
European linguistic family) were classified in the similar sub-category; whereas, 
ethnic conflicts involving groups that speak different languages which do not belong 
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to the same main branch of the same linguistic family were classified in the non-
similar sub-category.  
Minorities at Risk Dataset 
The MAR dataset, for its part, seeks to examine the situation of minorities groups 
throughout the world. This dataset was created and is managed by the Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), based at the University of 
Maryland. The MAR dataset is composed of three hundred twenty-one ethnic groups 
throughout the world which, at one point of the period which is covered by the dataset, 
were deemed to be politically active.8 The MAR project identifies where the ethnic groups 
are, what they do, and what happens to them. The project concentrates specifically on 
ethnopolitical groups and non-state communal groups which have "political significance" 
because of their status and political actions. The MAR project is, hence, composed of 
internal conflicts.  
The MAR project determines political significance based on two criteria: 
• The ethnic group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory 
treatment in comparison to other groups in a society.  
• The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defence or 
promotion of its self-defined interests.  
This study will use the phase IV of the MAR dataset which was released in February 
2005 and accounts for data from 1945 up to, and including, 2003.  
                                                            
8 The number of conflicts advertised on the MAR official website is less than this amount because the number 
of conflicts on the MAR website refers to groups which can still be considered politically active, whereas the 
MAR data includes groups which no longer fulfill that criterion. 
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The MAR dataset includes immigrant groups which are in conflict with other ethnic 
groups. These groups do not possess the same characteristics that this study has identified 
to groups in traditional ethnic conflicts.9 In order to filter conflicts which involve 
immigrants groups, the Ethno-Political Group Type variable was used. If conflicts posses a 
value of 3 (ethno-class, corresponding to foreign implanted groups without a specific 
territorial characteristic), they were excluded from the study. This process was not 
necessary with the BD dataset because such conflicts were not initially incorporated in the 
dataset. The results of this action led to two hundred eighty-nine conflicts being used as the 
population for the MAR study.  
Seeing that all the conflicts in the MAR dataset are ethnic in origin, a triage to fit 
ethnic conflict specificities was not necessary. The MAR dataset also has classified ethnic 
conflicts along ethnic categories. However, the classification of the MAR dataset is 
different from mine. I, thus, decided to create five ethnic identity categories in line with the 
framework of this study. To reclassify the different conflicts in the MAR dataset, the mean 
category of the variables was utilized. Here is how I relabelled the conflicts in the MAR 
dataset to fit my classification: 
• Religion: the Different Group Religion variable was used to classify conflicts in the 
religion category. The Different Group Religion variable, labelled as BELIEF, 
differentiates the religious beliefs of the conflicting parties along religious lines. 
The Different Group Religion variable ranges from 0 to 3. Conflicts with values of 1 
(different sect within same religion) and 3 (different religion) were categorized in 
this category. The other conflicts, coded 0 and 2, were deemed to be non-religious. 
                                                            
9 The characteristics of immigrant groups are not the same as those of traditional ethnic groups which this 
study seeks to explore, notably because of the lack of territorial attachment. For specific characteristics on 
immigrant ethnic groups see Fuchs 1993; Sanders 2002.  
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• Language: the Different Language variable, labelled as CULDIFX2, delimited the 
ethnic conflicts in the language category. The Different Language variable 
differentiates linguistic similarity of the conflicting groups and ranges from 0 to 2. 
Conflicts with values of 1 (some indeterminate differential) and 2 (significant 
differential) were entered in this category. Those coded with a value of 0 were 
classified as non-linguistic in nature. 
• Race: The Different Physical Appearance variable of the dataset was used to sort 
conflicts in the race category. The Different Physical Appearance variable, labelled 
as RACE, was used to differentiate the physical traits of the conflicting groups. This 
variable ranges in value from 0 to 3. If the conflict possessed a value of 3 (different 
racial stock, little or no intermixture), the only value that I consider to be racial, they 
were judged to have a racial difference and were entered in the race category; thus, 
the others were considered non-racial. Furthermore, conflicts with a value of 0 
(unknown) were entered as system missing. This procedure was undertaken in order 
to keep only properly coded conflicts. The coded value of unknown does not permit 
to identify any particularities about the racial characteristics of the groups and 
should, thus, be excluded.10    
• Non-Fundamental: the constituted categories were utilized to create the non-
fundamental category. Conflicts with a dichotomised value of 0 in the religion, 
language and race categories were entered as non-fundamental identities.  
• Multiple Identities: if the conflicts were entered in two or three of the fundamental 
ethnic identity categories, they were also entered in the multiple identities 
                                                            
10 It is important to note that this procedure led to a considerably reduced amount of cases for the statistical 
analyses. However, all the analyses were performed with an alternate version of the race variable which 
included the unknown value coded as 0 instead as system missing and the results did not indicate an important 
difference which would have warranted the inclusion of these cases. 
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categories. Also, the multiple identities category was divided into two sub-
categories, one formed of two fundamental ethnic identities and the other of three 
fundamental ethnic identities, to further explore the impact of the number of ethnic 
identity differences on conflict intensity. 
Additionally, the religion and language categories were also divided into sub-
categories for a more thorough investigation: 
• The sub-classification of religious conflicts was determined by categorizing 
conflicts with a value of 1 in the sectarian category and those with a value of 3 were 
classified in the non-sectarian category.  
• Conflicts entered in the language category that possessed a value of 1 were entered 
in the similar sub-category, and those with a value of 2 were placed in the non-
similar sub-category.11  
It is important to note that for all the MAR data related to ethnic identity variables, 
only whole numbers were used. Coded values with decimals were rounded downwards. The 
theory behind this action is that either the conflict reached the threshold of the coded value 
or it did not.  
Statistical Analysis 
In order to bring forth answers to the questions that form the basis of this study, and 
thus accept or reject our hypotheses, statistical analyses were necessary to arrive at results. 
The data was analyzed to allow for thorough results for all four research questions. 
                                                            
11 It is important to underline that this study was different from Laitin (2000a) because the groups with a value 
of 3 in the Ethno-Political Group Type variable (ethno-class, corresponding to foreign implanted groups 
without a specific territorial characteristic) were filtered out. Laitin seemingly left these groups in his study. I 
believe that, seeing that these groups are not traditional ethnic groups by our definition, the results of that 
study may have been erred by their inclusion. 
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The analysis of the data was done in four parts for the first question, and three for the 
subsequent three questions. First of all, a preliminary comparison of the totals for each 
category of ethnic conflicts was undertaken. Afterwards, the means of the conflict intensity 
measures were tallied and compared in an initial analysis to evaluate the influence of each 
of the ethnic identities. Thereafter, independent-sample t-tests were performed to compare, 
in a more thorough and statistically meaningful manner, the means of the conflict measures 
for the different ethnic identities. The independent-sample t-tests were performed on the 
five ethnic identity categories and on the variables in the three sub-category classifications 
for both datasets. Stationary data derived from the conflict averages of MAR’s periodic 
data were used for all the averages and independent-sample t-tests, except for those relating 
to the first question. For these tests, I chose to use the non-averaged annual data because of 
the more important significance it could produce. For the last three research questions, the 
statistical analyses ended at this procedure.  
However, for the first question an extra statistical analysis was added. The final step 
consisted of OLS linear regressions which were carried out to extract the specific influence 
of each ethnic identity variable on the intensity of the conflicts. Two types of regressions 
were performed. Given that the MAR dataset includes both periodic and annual values, it 
allowed for static and dynamic time-series regressions of the data. The static regressions 
were performed with stationary data derived from the conflict averages of the periodic data 
and the time-series regressions with the non-averaged annual data. Time-series analyses 
allow for a more in-depth statistical analysis, especially when it relates to statistical 
inferences (Hamilton 1994). However, seeing as the BD dataset does not have contiguous 
data, only a static regression was performed for the dataset. The two types of statistical 
regressions were conducted in four steps. Initially, only the fundamental ethnic identities 
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were regressed with each other. Afterwards, the five control variables were added to the 
three fundamental ethnic identities. Finally, the multiple identities variable was introduced 
in the two linear regressions; one with only the three fundamental ethnic identities and the 
other with those variables and the controls. Thus, a total of four linear regressions were 
performed for each intensity measure.  
These statistical analyses allowed for results to accurately evaluate our hypotheses 
and, hence, answer the questions about the influence of ethnic identity on conflict intensity. 
 With the research design in place, we now turn our attention in the following 
chapter to the results of the data analyses.  
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4 
Results 
 This chapter will present the results of the data analyses which were designed in 
order to answer the questions which form the core of this study and, subsequently, accept or 
reject the hypotheses which were brought forth. It will be composed of two main sections: a 
first section will present the results of the statistical analyses and the answers to the four 
main questions, and a second section will discuss the significance and the impact of the 
results.  
Presentation of the Result: 
Which type of ethnic identity leads to a higher intensity in ethnic group conflicts?  
In order to properly examine this enquiry, it is important to firstly look at the results 
of the classifications of the ethnic conflicts into the five fundamental ethnic identity 
categories. Annexes 1 and 2 provide a full picture of the classification for the retained 
ethnic conflicts of both datasets into the five ethnic identity categories, as well as the 
religion and language sub-categories.  
Table 1 displays the summary results of the classification of the retained ethnic 
conflicts for, respectively, the BD dataset and the MAR dataset. The main element which 
jumps out from these figures has to be the substantial number of ethnic conflicts which 
posses a linguistic element. This pattern is noticeable in both datasets. Another important 
element that is visible from the figures presented above is the important role that religion 
seems to play in ethnic conflicts. Although it does not seem to be as central as language, 
religion does appear to be a noteworthy feature of ethnic conflicts; it is involved in half of 
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the ethnic conflicts in both datasets. Furthermore, the figures also reveal the relatively weak 
amount of ethnic conflicts with a racial difference between the protagonists. It is worth 
nothing that this situation might simply be due to the fact that groups from different races 
are not very often in direct contact with each other, especially when compared to the two 
other fundamental ethnic identities. Another notable trait of the results is that ethnic 
conflicts often possess multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences; more than a third 
of the cases involve more than one fundamental ethnic identities. A final, but major, 
observation of this table indicates that generally there are not very many ethnic conflicts 
which are not based on fundamental ethnic identities.  
 
Table 1: Ethnic Conflict Classification 
 Total 
Number Religion Language Race 
Non-
Fundamental 
Multiple 
Identities 
 
BD 84 39 66 4 11 36 
MAR 289 142 243 35 20 127 
 
The preceding analysis was based only on the totals of ethnic conflicts; it is, thus, fair 
to state that it is quite a limited and superficial perspective which is in need of a more in-
depth examination. The number of conflicts might simply be caused by the degree of 
contact of the different ethnicities.  
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Table 2: Mean Differences for the BD Dataset 
 Battle Deaths Years 
 Mean 
Mean 
Difference T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Difference T-Score 
Religion 2672.4 1420.1 1.68* 7.7 -2.51 -1.11 
Language 2140.2 935.8 1.45 8.8 -0.86 -0.27 
Race 1258.5 -702.6 -0.82 2.5 -6.79 -5.21*** 
Non-
Fundamental 635.2 -1508.8 -2.76*** 11.8 3.25 0.72 
Multiple 
Identities 2639.6 1244.5 1.44 7.5 -2.51 -1.13 
All Conflicts 1928.5 - - 9.0 - - 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A perspective which could give a better insight into the potential influence of the 
ethnic identities on conflict severity is a comparison of the means for the conflict measures 
for each ethnic identity. The results of such comparisons for the BD dataset are displayed in 
Table 2. The table, firstly, displays the means of the specific measures of conflict intensity, 
the number of battle deaths and the years of conflict, in relation to each ethnic identity. The 
figures show that the religion and language identities along with conflicts affected by 
multiple identity differences are on average the deadliest. Our theory would have predicted 
this sequencing. Nevertheless, in terms of time-span, the results do not show the same 
tendency. In this measure of conflict intensity, it is the non-fundamental identity, which 
displays a considerably lower average death toll than the other ethnic identities, which 
distinguishes itself by the high number of years of conflict associated to it. In addition, one 
has to note the low number of years of conflict related to the race identity. The results for 
the years of conflict measure are not at all what our theory would have expected. Figure 1 
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further emphasizes, by giving a graphical picture, the distinction between the averages of 
the different identities in relation to the two different measures of intensity for ethnic 
conflicts in the BD dataset. 
 
Figure 1: Averages of Conflict Intensity by Identity Type for the BD dataset 
 
Figure 1 combines both conflict intensity measures in a single column per ethnic identity category. To prevent 
any possible confusion, the scale on the left of the figure refers to the Battle Deaths measure (darker grey 
columns) and the scale on the right side is associated with the Years measure (lighter grey columns). 
 
In an attempt to further comprehend the relationship between the identities and the 
levels of conflict, Table 2 also displays the results of independent-sample t-tests which 
were performed on all the ethnic identity categories in order to compare the mean of the 
specific identity with all those not in that category. The results of these tests show 
important findings. Firstly, the results for the battle deaths measure indicate that religion 
positively and significantly affects, at p < 0.1, the average of battle deaths. Conflicts with a 
religious difference show a higher death toll than those without religion as a factor of 
distinction. These results show that religious identity leads to more battle deaths in ethnic 
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conflicts. On the reverse end of the death spectrum, non-fundamental identities demonstrate 
a strong and very significant negative influence on battle deaths in comparison with 
conflicts with fundamental ethnic identities (p < 0.01). Consequently, it can be stated that 
conflicts which are divided along non-fundamental identities are less deadly than conflicts 
with fundamental ethnic identity differences. Furthermore, it was surprising for us to find 
that racial distinction seems to negatively impact conflict intensity; although without 
reaching any level of significance. The results for the battle deaths measure were, all in all, 
quite positive for our theory. However, the results were not the same for the years of 
conflict measure. In that measure, the results did not follow the predictions of our theory. 
An important observation from these results relates to the means between conflicts 
distinguished by race and those which are not. Race, once again, seems to negatively 
influence conflict intensity, but this time very significantly (p < 0.01). This observation  
 
Table 3: Mean Differences for the MAR Dataset  
 Protest Rebellion 
 Mean 
Mean 
Difference T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Difference T-Score 
Religion 0.29 0.00 0.03 0.15 -0.03 -2.82*** 
Language 0.31 0.08 7.35*** 0.17 0.05 4.54*** 
Race 0.26 -0.09 -5.93*** 0.17 0.02 1.12 
Non-
Fundamental 0.20 -0.11 -6.70*** 0.16 0.00 -0.18 
Multiple 
Identities 0.30 0.01 0.71 0.16 0.00 -0.30 
All Conflicts 0.27 - - 0.16 - - 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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shows that conflicts with a racial component are significantly shorter in comparison to 
conflicts without a racial component. 
The same process was undertaken with the MAR dataset and the results are displayed 
in Table 3. The numbers resulting from the means of the MAR dataset for the protest 
measure reveal a trend in the same direction as the battle deaths measure for the BD 
dataset. As for the rebellion measure, the means display almost no difference. Figure 2 
provides a clearer image of the variations in averages related to each ethnic identity for the 
two variables which form the measures of conflict intensity for the MAR dataset.  
 
Figure 2: Averages of Conflict Intensity by Identity Type for the MAR dataset 
 
 
The results of the independent-sample t-tests for the MAR dataset demonstrate, 
firstly, and most strikingly, that the language identity shows the most important differences 
between means of linguistic conflicts and those which are not, in both measures, and both 
at a significance of p < 0.01. Language seems to strongly and positively affect conflict 
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intensity. As for religious conflicts, they demonstrated no difference from non-religious 
conflicts in the protest measure, but were significantly less intense in the rebellion measure 
(p < 0.01). These results for the religion identity do not follow our reasoning of what the 
outcome should have been. The results for the race identity are somewhat mixed. Racial 
conflicts lead to significantly reduced protest intensity than non-racial conflicts (p < 0.01), 
but they were more intense in the rebellion measure than non-racial conflicts. Also, the 
non-fundamental identity seems to negatively affect conflict intensity, and quite 
significantly in the protest measure (p < 0.01).  
Overall, the results in both Tables 2 and 3 do not perfectly confirm our theory in 
regards to the comparison of the three fundamental ethnic identities. They also do not 
permit to clearly rank-order these three ethnic identities. However, the comparison of the 
means of the various ethnic identities has clearly demonstrated that conflicts based on non-
fundamental ethnic differences lead to less conflict intensity than conflicts with 
fundamental ethnic distinctions, except in terms of the years of conflict measure in the BD 
dataset. We can, nonetheless, state that these results are generally in accordance with our 
hypothesis (H1). However, further statistical analysis was needed in order to achieve fuller 
and more comprehensive results. 
The results of the comparison of means of the various ethnic identities, although 
interesting and insightful, do not allow for an understanding of the specific influence of 
each ethnic identity on conflict intensity. They permit us to see if there might be patterns in 
the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. However, such a 
comparison is quite limited in its explicative ability. Hence, an in-depth statistical analysis 
would be necessary to examine the true nature of the relationships between the ethnic 
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identities and the measures of conflict intensity. To achieve this objective, linear 
regressions were performed on both measures of each datasets.  
 
Table 4: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for the BD Dataset 
  Battle Deaths Years 
Religion 1317.21 1745.79 -3.06 -4.23 
Language 517.75 694.49 -1.08 -1.56 
Race 239.83 451.91 -8.91 -9.49 
Multiple Identities - -530.20 - 1.44 
Constant 889.19 765.48 11.68 12.02 
N 83 83 83 83 
R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
The results for the linear regressions which were performed on the stationary data of 
the BD dataset are presented in Table 4. The results of the fundamental ethnic identities 
performed with battle deaths as the measure of conflict intensity are concordant with the 
theory we put forward. Religion has the greater positive effect among the fundamental 
ethnic identities, followed by language and race. Furthermore, when the identities are 
compared to each other, using the standardized coefficients (not reported), the same order 
of identity impact is noticed. However, when the years of conflict were used as the 
dependant variable, the results are quite the contrary; no single fundamental identity 
displayed a positive effect, the complete opposite of the expectations of our theory. This 
means that each fundamental identity is associated with shorter conflicts than non-
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fundamental identities. The only positive effect was generated by multiple identities. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to note that none of the results reached any level of 
significance. Considering the small number of cases in the analyses, the lack of significance 
is not surprising. 
Linear regressions were also performed on the stationary data from the MAR dataset 
and the results are presented in Table 5. The results show that the race identity was 
throughout these regression analyses the highest determinant among the three fundamental 
ethnic identities and the only fundamental identity to have a positive effect on conflict in all 
the regressions. The impact of the race variable was slightly negatively affected by the 
addition of the control variables in the rebellion measure; but in contrast, race’s influence 
increased slightly when the control variables were introduced in the protest measure. The 
results also demonstrate that throughout almost all the regressions the religious identity 
always negatively affected conflict intensity. This is far from the case of the results of the 
battle deaths measure of Table 4; and completely contrary to the expectations of our theory. 
The language identity, for its part, displayed a positive effect on conflict which turned 
negative when the control variables were added. However, statistical significance was not a 
feature of the identity variables in these regressions; it was only attained by religion in one 
instance. This phenomenon is perhaps due to the low number of cases. Though it is also 
interesting to highlight the strong increase in the R-Squared values after the introduction of 
the control variables; meaning that identities seemingly contributed little to the explained 
variance of the conflict measures. 
Furthermore, Table 5 presents some interesting results in relation to the control 
variables. The results show a positive influence with very strong significance for the lost 
autonomy variable in both conflict intensity measures (p < 0.01). The regime type also 
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shows a positive and significant influence on the protest measure (p < 0.01); but is, on the 
other hand, a significantly, at p < 0.1, negative effect in the rebellion measure. These two 
variables were the only ones to present regular significance values in the results. It is also 
interesting to note the nil effect of the economic difference and political difference 
variables for both measures. 
Table 5: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for MAR Dataset (Static Data)12   
 Protest Rebellion 
Religion -0.06 -0.07 -0.08* -0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 
Language 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 
Race 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Multiple 
Identities - 0.01 - 0.01 - -0.09 - -0.04 
Regime - - 0.31*** 0.31*** - - -0.18* -0.18* 
Lost Autonomy - - 0.34** 0.34** - - 0.45*** 0.45*** 
Group 
Concentration - - 0.02 0.02 - - 0.08 0.08 
Economic 
Difference - - 0.00 0.00 - - 0.00 0.00 
Political 
Difference - - 0.00 0.00 - - 0.00 0.00 
Constant 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.18 
N 111 111 82 82 111 111 82 82 
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.33 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.17 
Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
                                                            
12 It is important to note that the low number of cases actually utilized for the linear regressions is caused by 
the fact that some of the MAR cases had missing data for specific categories, excluding such cases from the 
linear regressions. It is also noteworthy to bring forth that most of the exclusions are due to missing data in 
the race variable. 
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Statistical regressions were also performed with dynamic data from the MAR dataset. 
These time-series analyses were performed because they allow for more precise statistical 
inferences. These results are presented in Table 6. The first highlights of these results are 
that the fundamental ethnic identities can be significant predictors of conflict intensity, as 
our theory expected. In the protest measure, the language identity has a significant positive 
influence (p < 0.01). The language identity is actually, based on the standardized 
coefficients (not reported), a greater determinant than four of the control variables for that 
measure. However, in the rebellion measure, the results turn round and language displays a 
negative influence when the controls are in the regressions. The race identity displays a 
very weak positive impact on the rebellion measure (without ever reaching significance), 
but it has a significant negative impact on the protest measure. As for religion, it displays a 
significant negative effect on conflict in all regressions; once again, far from what our 
theory would have expected. Table 6 also shows that multiple identities are a greater 
determinant of conflict intensity than single fundamental identities, as our theory predicted; 
actually increasing in influence when the controls were added in the rebellion regression.  
As for the control variables, Table 6 shows some differences from the results 
obtained in Table 5. Group concentration is the only variable to have a significant positive 
impact on both measures (p < 0.01). Furthermore, we can note that the lost autonomy 
variable stood out from the other variables as a significant positive predictor, but only in the 
rebellion regression; displaying a significant negative influence on conflict in the protest 
variable (p < 0.05).  
All in all, some important conclusions from the linear regressions must be presented. 
Firstly, it can be stated that Tables 4 and 5 display a certain effect of the ethnic identities on 
conflict intensity. However, the significance of these results must be attenuated due to the 
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weak number of cases utilized for the linear regressions. Nonetheless, we can also conclude 
that Tables 5 and 6 display a somewhat similar trends but with more significant and 
noteworthy results in the latter grid. Lastly, it is important to note that generally the R-
Squared values are quite weak and it must be stated that the identity variables do not 
explain the full picture of the dependent variables. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for MAR Dataset (Time-Series Data) 
 Protest Rebellion 
Religion -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.03** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.06* -0.07*** -0.12*** 
Language 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.02 -.010*** -0.12*** 
Race -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.04** -0.06*** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Multiple 
Identities - 0.08** - 0.07* - 0.00 - 0.06 
Regime - - 0.02*** 0.02*** - - -0.01*** -0.01*** 
Lost Autonomy - - -0.12** -0.11** - - 0.27*** 0.28*** 
Group 
Concentration - - 0.06*** 0.07*** - - 0.14*** 0.14*** 
Economic 
Difference - - 0.01** 0.00* - - 0.00 0.00 
Political 
Difference - - -0.01** -0.01* - - 0.00 0.00 
Constant 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 
N 1322 1322 1243 1243 1318 1318 1240 1240 
R-Squared 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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With all the results presented above, we are, thus, able to answer the first of our 
research questions. The answer of this question will be made in two parts. Firstly, we will 
present the results for the categories of ethnic conflicts which we created (fundamental and 
non-fundamental). Secondly, we will attempt to establish the order of conflict intensity of 
the three fundamental ethnic identities. 
Firstly, I believe that the results presented above lead to a response in terms of which 
category of ethnic identity presents a higher level of conflict intensity. The results 
demonstrate that the non-fundamental ethnic identity category generally showed weaker 
conflict intensity across the conflict measures and examinations when compared to 
fundamental ethnic identities. Therefore, I believe that we can accept our hypothesis (H1) 
that was set forth and establish that fundamental ethnic identities lead to higher conflict 
intensity than non-fundamental ethnic identities. 
Secondly, in contradiction to the above answer, I believe that the results do not permit 
to classify the order of the three fundamental ethnic identities. The analysis performed on 
the BD dataset demonstrated a general advantage to the religion identity in terms of having 
higher death tolls. The language variable also showed a strong influence on battle deaths. 
The race identity, for its part, was shown to have a lesser influence on the two measures of 
conflict intensity of the BD dataset. As for the MAR dataset, on the other hand, the results 
demonstrate a general advantage for race in terms of generating a higher propensity of 
conflict. The linguistic identity occasionally displayed a relatively strong impact on the two 
measures of conflict intensity. Religion was, however, almost always shown to have a 
negative impact on conflict intensity; the opposite result of the battle deaths measure of the 
BD dataset. I believe that it is safe to state that there is no obvious indication of a specific 
effect on conflict from any of the fundamental ethnic identities. With such results, one 
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must, thus, acknowledge that there can be no clear order of conflict intensity across datasets 
amongst the three fundamental ethnic identities. Therefore, a conclusion as to the 
distinction along conflict intensity of the three fundamental ethnic identities cannot be put 
forward. Consequently, with the present information, it is impossible to accept or reject our 
initial hypothesis (H1) on the order of the fundamental ethnic identities in relevance to 
conflict intensity. 
Are conflicts between groups with multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences 
more prone to higher levels of intensity than conflicts with only one fundamental ethnic 
identity distinction?  
We had also hypothesized that conflicts with more than one fundamental ethnic 
identity difference between the conflicting groups would have higher conflict intensity than 
conflicts based on just one fundamental ethnic identity difference. The results of the 
statistical analyses previously performed provide a tentative answer to this question. The 
results so far are in line with our hypothesis (H2) which stated that conflicts with multiple 
fundamental ethnic identities lead to higher conflict intensity than single identity conflicts.  
Still, a further exploration of the impact of the number of fundamental ethnic identity 
distinctions on conflict intensity was undertaken. We examined the multiple identities 
category in order to extrapolate the impact of the distinction between multiple ethnic 
identity conflict with two fundamental ethnic identity differences and those with three such 
distinctions. Due to a lack of conflicts with all three fundamental ethnic identities in the BD 
dataset, this procedure was only conducted with the MAR dataset. 
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Table 7: Mean Differences for each Category of Multiple Identity Conflicts  
 Total 
Protest Rebellion 
Mean Mean Differ. T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Differ. T-Score 
2 Fundamental 
Ethnic Identities 103 0.31 - - 0.14 - - 
3 Fundamental 
Ethnic Identities 26 0.31 0.00 -0.01 0.22 0.08 1.19 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
The number of conflicts for each category of multiple identity conflicts is presented 
in the first column of Table 7. There is a clear pattern demonstrated in these results. It is 
much rarer to have conflicts with all three fundamental ethnic identities distinguishing the 
conflicting groups. The averages for each category of multiple identity conflicts are also 
presented in Table 7. The results suggest an apparent influence of the number of 
fundamental ethnic identities which differentiate groups in conflict. Although there is no 
difference for the protest measure, the results of the rebellion measure point to a propensity 
for conflicts with three fundamental ethnic differences to have greater conflict intensity 
than conflicts with two such identity differences. The independent-sample t-tests, however, 
note that none of these results attain statistical significance. Though, we must remember 
that few cases are involved. Still, they tend to indicate that the greater the number of 
fundamental ethnic identity differences amongst conflicting groups, the higher conflict 
gravity will be.   
To return to our initial hypothesis (H2) on the effects of multiple ethnic identities on 
conflict intensity, I believe that the result do show a pattern. Thus, I believe that we can 
find support for the hypothesis (H2) that multiple ethnic identity conflicts lead to greater 
conflict intensity than single fundamental ethnic identity conflicts. It would seem that the 
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more ethnic identity differences are implicated in conflicts the more intense those conflicts 
will be. Although, it is clear that more research into this question is needed. 
Are sectarian religious conflicts prone to weaker levels of intensity than conflicts 
between religious identities from different major religions? 
Let us first look at the number of conflicts for each category that is presented in Table 
8 (first column). We can see that sectarian conflicts represent a much smaller proportion of 
religious conflicts than non-sectarian conflicts. Next, we examined the means of the four 
conflict measures for both religious identities. The results, also presented in Table 8, show 
that sectarian conflicts have lower means when compared to non-sectarian conflicts for all 
four measures of conflict intensity, in accordance with the expectations of our theory. The  
 
Table 8: Mean Differences for Sectarianism  
BD 
 Total 
Deaths Years 
Mean Mean Differ. T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Differ. T-Score 
Sectarian 8 2603.01 -86.71 -0.06 5.50 -2.69 -0.97 
Non-Sectarian 32 2689.72 - - 8.19 - - 
MAR 
 Total 
Protest Rebellion 
Mean Mean Differ. T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Differ. T-Score 
Sectarian 38 0.30 -0.03 -0.59 0.14 -0.04 -0.61 
Non-Sectarian 104 0.32 - - 0.18 - - 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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results of the independent-sample t-tests indicate that, although no level of significance was 
attained, all four measures of conflict intensity exhibited weaker intensity for sectarian 
conflicts. 
Thus, with these results, I believe that we are able to answer our research question on 
the influence of religious sectarianism on conflict intensity. The results of the analyses that 
were performed denote that religious conflicts based on a sectarian difference tend to have 
slightly lesser conflict intensity. Therefore, we can tentatively accept our hypothesis (H3) 
that sectarian religious conflicts have weaker levels of conflict intensity than conflicts 
between groups from different major religions.  
Are linguistic ethnic conflicts between groups who share similar languages less 
intense than conflicts between groups with non-similar linguistic distinctions? 
 As with the other questions which we have already examined in this study, we start 
by examining the number of each category of linguistic conflicts. The first column of Table 
9 presents the distribution of the linguistic conflicts for both datasets. These numbers 
indicate that there are more non-similar linguistic conflicts in both datasets, especially in 
the MAR data.  
When examining means for both categories of linguistic conflicts, also in Table 9, the 
linguistically similar conflicts continue to demonstrate the same pattern found in the 
preceding section. The averages for all but one conflict measure indicate a pronounced 
discrepancy between both linguistic categories with the non-similar linguistic conflicts 
having higher averages. The only conflict measure which diverges from this direction is the 
protest measure. Independent-sample t-tests, into the linguistic conflict data, confirm that 
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only one difference is significant: the rebellion measure (p < 0.1). Although only one 
difference reached a level of significance, there is a noticeable direction to the results. 
 
Table 9: Mean Differences for Linguistic Similarity 
BD 
 Total 
Deaths Years 
Mean Mean Differ. T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Differ. T-Score 
Similarity 28 1805.14 -474.37 -0.46 7.89 -1.47 -0.56 
Non-Similar 38 2279.51 - - 9.36 - - 
MAR 
 Total 
Protest Rebellion 
Mean Mean Differ. T-Score Mean 
Mean 
Differ. T-Score 
Similarity 7 0.35 0.03 0.33 0.08 -0.09 -1.95* 
Non-Similar 236 0.31 - - 0.16 - - 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
The results of the analyses which were performed on the linguistic conflicts allow us 
to answer the question on the relationship of linguistic similarity and conflict intensity 
which was posed. The results show that linguistic conflicts based on a linguistic difference 
between similar languages tend to have weaker conflict intensity. Therefore, we can 
tentatively accept our hypothesis (H4) which indicates that linguistic ethnic conflicts 
between groups who share similar languages are less intense than conflicts between groups 
with non-similar linguistic distinctions.  
69 
 
Discussion  
Ethnic identity seems to matter, so can be summed up the above mentioned results of 
our study.  Our findings have demonstrated that ethnic identities play a role on the level of 
intensity in conflicts. The results lead to a series of major implications. The first major 
significance of this affirmation is that ethnic identity should, thus, be regarded as a variable 
which influences the gravity of ethnic conflicts. Ethnicity has to, hence, be added to the 
commonly referred factors which are used to account for intensity in ethnic conflicts. 
Ethnicity does not lead to conflicts; it is not a direct cause of conflicts between groups. 
However, it can be stated that it does impact on the dynamics of groups in conflict. As the 
results presented in this study have shown, different types of ethnic difference between 
groups in conflict will, in general, lead to different levels of conflict intensity. Therefore, 
our findings indicate that ethnic identity is an element that affects the intensity of the 
conflict.    
The results, secondly, impact the theory that we proposed. The results of our study re-
enforce, although not perfectly, the theory we developed on the relationship between ethnic 
identities and conflict intensity and, also, allow for a better understanding of this 
phenomenon. The findings, firstly, allow to demonstrate that ethnic conflicts based on 
fundamental ethnic differences lead to greater conflict intensity. The emotional attachments 
related to fundamental ethnic identities prove to be stronger and more volatile than those of 
non-fundamental ethnic identities; rendering conflicts involving such ethnic identities more 
passionate and intense. What this signifies for “real life” is that ethnic groups who share the 
same religion, speak the same language and are racially the same tend to have conflicts that 
are weaker in intensity.  
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The results also bring a second major implication for our theory. Unfortunately, the 
findings are not as positive for our theory in respects to the difference among the three 
fundamental ethnic identities. They do not permit us to establish which of the fundamental 
ethnic identities lead to greater conflict intensities. This situation can be due to either one of 
two possibilities. Firstly, the data or the measures utilized were improperly used or were 
simply inadequate to arrive at a proper conclusion. The second possibility is that there is 
truly no intensity distinction between the three fundamental ethnic identities. It might, thus, 
very well be that there is no viable difference in terms of conflict gravity amongst all three 
fundamental ethnic identities because they all represent fundamental emotional 
attachments. In other words, our initial hypothesis (H1) which tried to establish prevalence 
among the three fundamental ethnic identities might be misconstrued. All three ethnic 
identities might represent the strongest form of ethnic attachment, the reason why we 
classified them as fundamental in the first place. It could, therefore, be that there are no 
weaker emotional connections among the three. Hence, distinction in terms of conflict 
intensity might only be possible when compared to non-fundamental ethnic identities. 
Comparisons with each other, as the results have shown, will not bring forth a conclusive 
sequence of intensity.  
As for conflicts centered on multiple ethnic identity differences, our third major 
impact, the results of the study suggest that the more fundamental ethnic identities involved 
in a conflict the more intense that conflict will be. The findings did permit to grasp the 
general assertion that the number of fundamental ethnic identities positively influences 
conflict intensity. Greater emotional attachments related to fundamental ethnic identities 
gathered together bring more hazardous conflicts.  
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The final major impact of the findings on our theory relates to the influence of the 
similarity of the ethnic groups on conflict intensity. Ethnic resemblance seems to have a 
way of mitigating the intensity of conflicts. The tension and hatred seem to be attenuated by 
a sense of distant attachment to the conflicting rival.  
The overall results of our study underline the importance of the emotional 
attachments in conflict intensity. Therefore, it can safely be stated that the varying levels of 
emotional strength related to the different fundamental ethnic identities, and from which 
distinct levels of passionate actions are derived, directly influence the gravity of the 
conflicts. 
Although the results derived from the study that we designed to test the influence of 
ethnic identities on conflict intensity presented us with some positive findings for our 
theory, there must be the admission of some problematic issues. The first critic should 
center on the fact that not all the tests came to the exact conclusion for which we hoped. 
We often had the case where one series of tests would lead to one conclusion and another 
would lead to a different one. This situation can be problematic. However, seldom are 
findings in studies completely linear in one direction. The importance lies on the conclusion 
derived from the myriad of the tests undertaken; and, furthermore, those conclusions are the 
results of the entirety of the results process. Another critic, still related to the results, has to 
do with the fact that some of the ethnic identities were in some tests found to have negative 
influences on conflict. This is obviously a problem because it can downgrade the 
importance of our results and, even, of our theory. However, once again, we should 
remember that rarely are results in a study one dimensional and focus on the total sum of 
the findings. Still, one more issue which might be seen as problematic with our study would 
have to relate to the coding of the ethnic conflicts and of the parameters of the test 
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variables.13 Surely some will find that a number of ethnic conflicts were coded in a 
different manner than they would have preferred; truthfully, even I came across this 
sentiment. Certain problems will surely be felt about the coding process; that the variables 
are not clearly distinguished or the coding is improper. These are all sound concerns. 
However, one must keep in mind that this is normally the case with such studies. This is 
one of the benefits of using a large-N dataset. The aggregation of the large test population 
will mitigate the possible effects of some issues with the coding process. 
Even if the results of the study, and even the study itself, are not perfect; they 
represent, nonetheless, a contribution to the understanding of ethnic conflicts. The findings 
isolate patterns in dynamics between ethnic identities and conflict intensities. They 
demonstrate that ethnic identity is a determinant of conflict intensity. These results are, 
furthermore, found in two separate datasets which were, moreover, differently coded. The 
fact that the same overall findings were ascertained from two different collections of 
conflict data is undoubtedly a re-enforcement to the results. Although not without some 
flaws, our research, through its overall findings and its conception, is an important addition 
to the comprehension of a very important phenomenon. 
The study should not be seen as the end to the questioning that we brought forward. It 
should be taken as a reference for further research on how ethnicity influences conflicts. 
More research on the influence of ethnicity on the gravity of ethnic conflicts should help 
further understand the exploration that this study sought to convey, assist in bringing more 
determined conclusions to some of the enquiries which we could not fully resolve and, 
                                                            
13 It is interesting to note that the results of the death toll measure of the BD dataset, in which the identity 
variables were coded by me, are almost perfectly in line with our theory. The results might be due to possibly 
a more appropriate coding of the conflicts than the MAR dataset. However, the results for the other measure 
of the BD dataset, the years measure, are completely the opposite of our theory. One reason for the latter 
situation might be that the non-contiguous nature of the measure impacted the results; or, another reason, it 
might that length is not an adequate measure of conflict intensity. 
 
73 
 
hopefully, further emphasize the conclusions which we were able to achieve. It should be 
part of a basis for a line of research questioning. It is a research that, I believe, explores the 
political psychology of ethnic conflicts.14 I would advance that this notion should 
correspond to understanding how ethnic identity influences groups and individuals. 
The discoveries which research brings are interesting, but what truly makes them 
important is their tangible nature. In other words, how are these findings applicable to real 
life? What makes them important? As we have already stated, the true aim of seeking 
further understanding of ethnic conflict dynamics is done, generally, in an attempt to help 
find some sort of rectifying contribution which would help lead to a resolution strategy or, 
at the very least, a sort of mitigation of intensity. 
The results of our research lead to, I believe, three important findings for the 
development of conflict prevention or resolution. Firstly, with ethnic identities being found 
to be determinants of conflict intensity, resolution strategies should, thus, take into account 
ethnicity as an important element in their strategies. If ethnic identities represent a factor 
which influences the gravity of ethnic conflicts, it is, hence, simply normal to examine the 
type of ethnic identities which are salient in a given conflict. As we have seen, the type of 
ethnic difference will differently affect the intensity of the conflicts. Furthermore, multiple 
identity conflicts might represent an important malleable element able to mitigate conflict 
intensity. To elaborate, researchers who specialize in ethnic conflict resolution or 
mitigation when dealing with conflicts based on multiple fundamental ethnic identity 
differences might consider strategies which emphasize the promotion of one fundamental 
ethnic identity. In other words, attempt to artificially render the multiple ethnic identity 
                                                            
14 The term political psychology of ethnic conflicts to our knowledge does not exist in the literature. Ross 
(1997) does refer to political psychology and ethnic conflicts; however, not as one term. Furthermore, Ross’ 
reference is to the impact of culture on both political psychology and ethnic conflicts and not on the influence 
of ethnic identity on group or individual behaviour. 
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conflict into a single salient identity conflict and, thus, attempt to reduce its intensity. 
Lastly, the findings of this study, or all other future studies which examine the impact of 
ethnic identity on conflict intensity, should be utilized in a preventative manner. More 
attention should, obviously, be paid to areas deemed to be riskier. A proper identification of 
the type of fundamental ethnic difference involved in group interactions should be 
established. This type of project, which to the best of my knowledge does not currently 
exist, would be a welcomed contribution to the work of researchers attempting to ascertain 
areas of concern for possible future ethnic discourse. Having the knowledge that certain 
types of ethnic differences are more prone to develop into conflict of a certain intensity is, 
unquestionable, beneficial information to have.  
The findings of our study have lead to important implications for the study of ethnic 
conflicts and, also, the development of prevention and resolution strategies for ethnic 
conflicts. Such new contributions have, therefore, to be considered as a welcomed addition 
to the understanding of ethnic conflicts.  
  
Conclusion 
 This study began with a poem which emphasized the perversion related to group 
distinction. Kipling’s poem presented the groups, composed of artificial entities that make 
up the “us versus them”, as non-concrete and malleable human creations. Our theoretical 
research re-enforced this notion suggesting that the lines which divide human beings truly 
do not exist; they are psychological in nature. Thus, the distinctions between groups of 
humans seem only to, strictly, exist in our heads.  
 Although they may not be tangible and concrete phenomena, it is undeniable that 
group divisions considerably influence our lives. They can even be stated as being the 
cause of great destruction and death; leading to wars and battles which have plagued human 
kind forever. The data on conflicts demonstrates that they have taken a recent internal turn. 
To be more explicit, the findings reveal that conflicts of an ethnic nature are tied to that 
rise. Conflicts which are based on ethnic groups have been increasing. This fact is a great 
concern because ethnic conflicts represented a source of tremendous instability and 
volatility which can lead to passionate and intense violence and can, subsequently, result in 
great pain and death. Due to the danger and risk represented by ethnic conflicts, we sought 
to examine the phenomenon in order to bring a greater understanding to it. 
In order to examine the dynamics which influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts, it 
was important to, firstly, examine the concept itself. At the outset of the study, a proper 
definition of ethnic conflicts was established in order to allow for the isolation of the proper 
conflict population. Ethnic conflicts can, thus, be said to be defined as a confrontation of 
parties with incompatible goals, who possess territorial attachments, and that are 
distinguished along ethnic identities. Furthermore, those ethnic identities are defined as 
dynamic and malleable group identities which are based on perceived values and 
connections and which become salient in an individual and group in a given situation. 
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They, further, possess an intrinsic emotion which renders them more dangerous than other 
group identities.  
Research into ethnic conflicts can be said to have a twofold purpose. It, firstly, seeks 
to inquire and explain the causes and dynamics of ethnic conflicts, and, thereafter, it 
ultimately attempts to find resolutions in order to end or, at the very least, control these 
disastrous manifestations of ethnic tensions. Ethnic conflict research could, thus, be 
summed up into three categories: studies examining the causal factors which lead to the 
onset of ethnic conflicts, those dealing with the variables which influence the intensity of 
ethnic conflicts, and, finally, researches which seek to prevent, mitigate or resolve ethnic 
conflicts.   
The literature on the causal factors of ethnic conflicts reveals that there are a myriad 
of elements which can be considered as causes of conflicts, none specifically exclusive to 
ethnic tensions. Furthermore, no one causal factor can be considered to be the single 
determining cause of a conflict. In other words, conflicts are complex phenomena which 
have multiple causal factors interacting with each other. The literature also exposes that the 
same conclusions are related to variables which influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts. 
Once again, there is not one single element which fully determines the intensity of a 
conflict between ethnic groups. Therefore, the complex social, cultural and psychological 
nature of ethnic conflicts demands multifaceted perspectives in order to properly 
comprehend the factors which cause and influence them.  
Although the literature presents a number of variables which have been demonstrated 
to influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts, it cannot be said to be exhaustive. One such 
gap relates to ethnic identities themselves. Although there have been studies undertaken to 
examine the manner in which ethnic identities impact on group behaviour and even on 
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conflict intensity, there is, however, one major problem with these studies. There has not, to 
our knowledge, been any study which has developed proper ethnic parameters to correctly 
examine the influence of ethnic identities on conflict intensity. Therefore, this study 
decided to correct this inaccuracy and developed such ethnic boundaries. There was, 
nevertheless, one inspiration which guided our theory. Sambanis (2001) brought forth the 
basis of our theory, stating that ethnicity should be examined through three identities: 
religion, language and race. I concur with that assertion and added that ethnicity itself 
should be seen as an umbrella notion incorporating all ethnic identities. Thus, ethnicity 
should not be seen as a group identity in itself, but, instead, as a category of group 
identities.  
Therefore, our study proposed a theory on ethnic distinction which presented the 
notion that there are three true ways of accurately distinguishing ethnic groups: religious 
beliefs, languages spoken and racial features. These, I believe, are the three clearest and 
most profound ways of distinguishing ethnic groups without the possibility of overlap and, 
thus, form what was presented as the fundamental ethnic identities. There can be no 
mistaking in the distinction of these three ethnic identities, unlike others. As we have 
stated, it is possible to confuse a Canadian from an American, or an Albertan from an 
Ontarian. But that mistake is much harder to make with a Muslim and a Christian, a 
Francophone and an Anglophone or an East Asian and a Black person. Furthermore, our 
theory also proposed that ethnic identities which cannot be classified in any of these three 
categories, tribes and regions for example, should be defined as non-fundamental ethnic 
identities. 
 Hence, with this new manner of distinguishing ethnic groups, the necessity was laid 
forth to verify how these ethnic identities influenced conflict intensity. The theory was that 
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ethnic identities which have a more profound emotional attachment when rendered salient 
in conflicts would lead to greater intensity in those conflicts. Therefore, we brought forth a 
series of questions dealing with the relationship between ethnic identity and conflict 
intensity. A sequence of tests were, thus, undertaken to examine the hypotheses which were 
advanced in order to answer our questions on the interaction of ethnic identity and conflict 
intensity. 
 The results of the tests, overall, demonstrated that ethnic identities with more 
intense emotional attachments lead to greater conflict intensity. Fundamental ethnic 
conflicts were shown to lead to more intense conflicts than non-fundamental ethnic 
conflicts. Also, similarity amongst ethnic groups was demonstrated to weaken conflict 
intensity. The assumption is that similarity between ethnic groups decreases the emotional 
volatility of conflicts; in other words, the passionate reaction involved in conflicts is 
alleviated. Furthermore, our study concluded that the more fundamental ethnic identity 
differences are involved in a conflict the more intense that conflict will be. The explanation 
of these findings derives from the fact that the more emotional attachments are salient the 
greater those attachments will positively impact the gravity of conflicts. However, the 
findings were unable to find any meaningful difference among the three fundamental ethnic 
identities. This result might be caused by the fact that there is truly no intensity distinction 
between the three fundamental ethnic identities because they all represent fundamental 
emotional attachments, the strongest form of ethnic relation. 
With the importance associated to ethnic conflicts, in academia and beyond, the 
findings of this study should lead to three major impacts for the development of strategies 
for conflict prevention or resolution. Strategies which seek to resolve conflicts should take 
into consideration ethnicity as an important element of their plan; it is simply normal to 
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identify and examine the type of ethnic identities which are salient in a given conflict. 
Furthermore, multiple identity conflicts might represent an important malleable element 
able to mitigate conflict intensity; resolution or mitigation strategies should, thus, focus on 
promoting one fundamental ethnic identity in these conflicts. They should attempt to 
artificially render the multiple ethnic identity conflict into a single salient identity conflict 
in order to reduce its intensity; hence, more easily resolving or alleviating ethnic conflicts. 
Moreover, findings on the impact of ethnic identity on conflict intensity should be used in a 
preventative manner. More attention should, thus, be given to areas deemed to be riskier for 
the onset or escalation of ethnic conflicts. A proper identification of the type of 
fundamental ethnic difference involved in group interactions would, hence, be a welcomed 
contribution to the work of researchers attempting to isolate areas of concern for possible 
future ethnic discourse.  
To conclude, one should be wary of which identities are involved in conflicts because 
some are more dangerous than others. 
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Annex 1- BD Dataset Group Classification 
 
Country Group Religion Language Race Non-Fundamental Multiple Identities Sectarian Non-Sectarian Similar Non- Similar 
Angola Cabinda      X  
Azerbaijan Armenians  X  X   X 
Bangladesh Jumma/Chittagong Hill Tracts  X  X   X 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Croats  X X    X 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Serbs  X X    X 
Burma (Myanmar) Arakanese   X     
Burma (Myanmar) Kachins  X X    X 
Burma (Myanmar) Karenni  X X    X 
Burma (Myanmar) Karens   X     
Burma (Myanmar) Mons    X    
Burma (Myanmar) Shans    X    
Burma (Myanmar) Wa    X    
Burundi Hutus      X  
China Taiwanese   X     
China Tibet    X    
Comoros Anjouan      X  
Congo Laris   X     
Cote D’Ivoire Northerners  X  X   X 
Croatia Serbs X  X    X 
Cyprus, Turkey Turks  X  X   X 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
(Zaire) 
Katanga   X     
Djibouti Afars   X     
Ethiopia Eritreans  X  X   X 
Ethiopia Ogaden  X  X   X 
Ethiopia Oromo    X    
Georgia Abkhazians    X    
Georgia Ossetians    X    
India Assamese   X     
India Bodos  X  X   X 
India Kashmiris  X X    X 
India Manipur    X    
89 
 
India Mizoram  X  X   X 
India Nagas  X X    X 
India Sikhs  X X    X 
India Tripura  X  X   X 
Indonesia Acehnese   X     
Indonesia East Timorese  X X    X 
Indonesia Papuans  X  X    
Iran Azeris    X    
Iran Kurds X  X    X 
Laos Hmongs    X    
Lebanon Sunnis X       
Liberia Gios and Manos      X  
Liberia Mandingos      X  
Macedonia Albanians  X  X   X 
Madagascar Southern Tulear Province      X  
Mexico Chiapas    X    
Morocco Saharawis   X     
Niger Toubous    X    
Niger Tuaregss    X    
Nigeria Biafra  X  X   X 
Nigeria Ijaws  X  X   X 
Nigeria Muslims  X  X   X 
Oman Dhofar region   X     
Oman State of Oman/Free Oman      X  
Pakistan Baluchis   X     
Pakistan Bangladesh   X     
Pakistan Mohajirs      X  
Papua New Guinea Bougainville      X  
Philippines Moros  X X    X 
Russia (Soviet 
Union) Armenians    X    
Russia (Soviet 
Union) Azeris  X  X   X 
Russia (Soviet 
Union) Baltics  X  X   X 
Russia (Soviet 
Union) Chechens  X  X   X 
Russia (Soviet 
Union) Dagestan  X  X   X 
Russia (Soviet 
Union) Ukraine   X     
Rwanda Tutsis and Hutus      X  
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Senegal Casamance  X X    X 
Somalia Darod clan      X  
Somalia Somaliland      X  
South Africa Blacks    X X  X 
South Africa Namibians     X   
Spain Basques    X    
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Tamils  X  X   X 
Sudan Darfuris    X    
Sudan Southerners  X X    X 
Surinam Maroons     X   
Thailand Patani (Malay Muslims)  X  X   X 
United Kingdom Catholics X       
Yemen (People's 
Republic of Yemen 
and Arab Republic 
of Yemen) 
Shias and Sunnis X       
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Albanians  X  X   X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Croats X  X    X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Slovenes X  X    X 
Zimbabwe 
(Rhodesia) Blacks     X   
84 7 32 28 38 4 11 36 39 66 
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Annex 2-MAR Dataset Group Classification 
 
Country Group Religion Language Race Non-Fundamental Multiple Identities Sectarian Non-Sectarian Similar Non-Similar 
Afghanistan Hazaras X   X   X 
Afghanistan Pashtuns    X    
Afghanistan Tajiks    X    
Afghanistan Uzbeks    X    
Albania Greeks  X  X   X 
Algeria Berbers    X    
Angola Bakongo    X    
Angola Cabinda    X    
Angola Ovimbundu    X    
Argentina Indigenous Peoples    X    
Australia Aborigines  X  X   X 
Azerbaijan Armenians  X  X   X 
Azerbaijan Lezgins X   X   X 
Azerbaijan Russians X   X   X 
Bahrain Shias       X  
Bangladesh Biharis    X    
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tribes  X  X X  X 
Bangladesh Hindus  X      
Belarus Poles  X  X   X 
Belarus Russians      X  
Bhutan Lhotshampas  X  X   X 
Bolivia Indigenous Highland Peoples    X    
Bolivia Lowland Indigenous Peoples    X    
Bosnia Croats  X  X   X 
Bosnia Muslims  X      
Bosnia Serbs  X  X   X 
Botswana San Bushmen  X  X   X 
Brazil Amazonian Indians    X    
Bulgaria Turks  X  X X  X 
Burma Hill Tribals  X  X   X 
Burma Kachins  X  X   X 
Burma Karens    X    
Burma Mons      X  
Burma Rohingya (Arakanese)  X  X   X 
Burma Shans    X    
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Burma Zomis (Chins)  X  X   X 
Burundi Hutus      X  
Burundi Tutsis      X  
Cambodia Chams  X  X   X 
Cambodia Vietnamese      X  
Cameroon Bamileke  X  X   X 
Cameroon Kirdis    X    
Cameroon Westerners    X    
Canada French Canadians X   X   X 
Canada Indigenous Peoples    X    
Canada Quebecois X   X   X 
Chad Northerners  X  X   X 
Chad Southerners  X  X   X 
Chile Indigenous Peoples  X  X   X 
China Hui Muslims X       
China Tibetans  X  X   X 
China Turkmen  X  X   X 
Colombia Indigenous Peoples    X    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the (ZAIRE) Bakongo    X    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the (ZAIRE) Kivu Region    X    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the (ZAIRE) Lingala    X    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the (ZAIRE) Luba    X    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the (ZAIRE) Lunda, Yeke    X    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the (ZAIRE) Ngbandi      X  
Congo, Rep. of the Laris      X  
Congo, Rep. of the M'boshi   X     
Croatia Serbs  X  X   X 
Cyprus Turkish Cypriots  X  X   X 
Czechoslovakia Hungarians    X    
Czechoslovakia Slovaks      X  
Czech Republic Slovaks      X  
Djibouti Afars    X    
Ecuador Indigenous Highland Peoples    X    
Ecuador Lowland Indigenous Peoples    X    
Egypt Copts  X      
El Salvador Indigenous Peoples X   X   X 
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Eritrea Afars X   X   X 
Estonia Russians    X    
Ethiopia Afars X   X   X 
Ethiopia Amhara  X  X   X 
Ethiopia Eritreans    X    
Ethiopia Nilo-Saharans  X  X X  X 
Ethiopia Oromo    X    
Ethiopia Somalis  X  X   X 
Ethiopia Tigreans    X    
Fiji East Indians  X  X X  X 
Fiji Fijians    X X   
France Basques    X    
France Bretons    X    
France Corsicans    X    
Georgia Abkhazians    X    
Georgia Adzhars  X      
Georgia Ossetians (South)    X    
Georgia Russians    X    
Ghana Ashanti    X    
Ghana Ewe    X    
Ghana Mossi-Dagomba  X  X   X 
Greece Muslims  X  X   X 
Guatemala Indigenous Peoples  X  X   X 
Guinea Fulani    X    
Guinea Malinka    X    
Guinea Susu    X    
Guyana Africans  X   X  X 
Guyana East Indians  X   X  X 
Honduras Indigenous Peoples    X    
India Assamese    X    
India Bodos    X    
India Kashmiris  X  X   X 
India Mizos  X  X X  X 
India Muslims  X  X   X 
India Nagas  X  X X  X 
India Santals  X  X X  X 
India Scheduled Tribes    X    
India Sikhs  X  X   X 
India Tripuras    X X  X 
Indonesia Acehnese      X  
Indonesia East Timorese    X    
Indonesia Papuans  X  X X  X 
Iran Arabs    X    
Iran Azerbaijanis    X    
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Iran Baha'is  X      
Iran Bakhtiari    X    
Iran Baluchis X   X   X 
Iran Christians  X  X   X 
Iran Kurds    X    
Iran Turkmen X   X   X 
Iraq Kurds    X    
Iraq Shias  X       
Iraq Sunnis      X  
Israel Palestinians  X  X   X 
Italy Sardinians    X    
Italy South Tyrolians    X    
Jordan Palestinians      X  
Kazakhstan Germans  X  X X  X 
Kazakhstan Russians  X  X X  X 
Kenya Kalenjins    X    
Kenya Kikuyu      X  
Kenya Kisii      X  
Kenya Luhya    X    
Kenya Luo X       
Kenya Maasais  X  X   X 
Kenya Rendille/Borana  X  X   X 
Kenya Somalis  X  X   X 
Kenya Turkana/Pokot  X  X   X 
Korea, South Honamese    X    
Kyrgyzstan Russians  X  X X  X 
Kyrgyzstan Uzbeks    X    
Laos Hmong  X  X X  X 
Latvia Russians    X    
Lebanon Druze  X      
Lebanon Maronite Christians  X      
Lebanon Palestinians  X      
Lebanon Shias   X      
Lebanon Sunnis  X      
Lithuania Poles    X    
Lithuania Russians  X  X   X 
Macedonia Albanians    X    
Macedonia Serbs X   X   X 
Madagascar Merina    X    
Malaysia Chinese  X  X   X 
Malaysia Dayaks  X  X   X 
Malaysia East Indians  X  X X  X 
Malaysia Kadazans  X  X   X 
Mali Mande    X    
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Mali Tuaregs    X    
Mauritania Kewri    X X  X 
Mexico Mayans    X    
Mexico Other Indigenous Peoples    X    
Mexico Zapotecs    X    
Moldova Gagauz    X    
Moldova Slavs    X    
Morocco Berbers    X    
Morocco Saharawis    X    
Namibia Basters    X    
Namibia East Caprivians   X     
Namibia San Bushmen  X  X   X 
New Zealand Maori X   X   X 
Nicaragua Indigenous Peoples X   X   X 
Niger Djerema-Songhai X   X   X 
Niger Hausa    X    
Niger Tuaregs    X    
Nigeria Hausa-Fulani  X  X   X 
Nigeria Ibo  X  X   X 
Nigeria Ijaw  X X    X 
Nigeria Ogani  X  X   X 
Nigeria Yoruba    X    
Pakistan Ahmadis X       
Pakistan Baluchis    X    
Pakistan Hindus  X      
Pakistan Mohajirs    X    
Pakistan Pashtuns (Pushtuns)    X    
Pakistan Sindhis    X    
Panama Indigenous Peoples    X    
Papua New Guinea Bouganvilleans    X    
Paraguay Indigenous Peoples    X    
Peru Indigenous Highland Peoples    X    
Peru Lowland Indigenous Peoples    X    
Philippines Igorots    X    
Philippines Moros  X  X   X 
Romania Germans    X    
Romania Hungarians X   X   X 
Russia Avars  X  X   X 
Russia Buryat  X  X X  X 
Russia Chechens  X  X   X 
Russia Ingush  X  X   X 
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Russia Karachay  X  X   X 
Russia Kumyks  X  X   X 
Russia Lezgins  X  X   X 
Russia Tatars  X  X X  X 
Russia Tuvinians  X  X X  X 
Russia Yakut X   X   X 
Rwanda Hutus      X  
Rwanda Tutsis      X  
Saudi Arabia Shias  X       
Senegal Diolas in Casamance X   X   X 
Sierra Leone Limba    X    
Sierra Leone Mende    X    
Sierra Leone Temne    X    
Singapore Malays  X  X   X 
Slovakia Hungarians    X    
Somalia Issaq      X  
South Africa Asians  X   X  X 
South Africa Coloreds      X  
South Africa Europeans    X X  X 
South Africa Xhosa    X X  X 
South Africa Zulus    X X  X 
Spain Basques    X    
Spain Catalans    X    
Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Tamils  X  X   X 
Sudan Darfur Black Muslims X   X   X 
Sudan Nuba    X    
Sudan Southerners    X X  X 
Switzerland Jurassians    X    
Syria Alawi X       
Syria Kurds X   X   X 
Taiwan Aboriginal Taiwanese    X    
Taiwan Mainland Chinese      X  
Taiwan Taiwanese    X    
Tajikistan Russians  X  X X  X 
Tanzania Zanzibaris  X      
Thailand Malay-Muslims  X  X   X 
Thailand Northern Hill Tribes  X  X   X 
Togo Ewe    X    
Togo Kabre    X    
Turkey Kurds X   X   X 
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Turkmenistan Russians  X  X X  X 
Uganda Acholi    X    
Uganda Ankole    X    
Uganda Baganda    X    
Uganda Kakwa  X  X   X 
Uganda Karamojong    X    
Uganda Konjo/Amba    X    
Uganda Langi    X    
Uganda Lugbara/Madi    X    
Uganda Nyarwanda    X    
Ukraine Crimean Russians    X    
Ukraine Crimean Tartars X   X   X 
Ukraine Russians X   X   X 
United Kingdom Catholics in Northern Ireland X       
United Kingdom Scots X       
United States of 
America Native Americans    X    
United States of 
America Native Hawaiians    X    
USSR Armenians X   X   X 
USSR Azerbaijanis  X  X X  X 
USSR Chechen/Ingush  X  X   X 
USSR Estonians X   X   X 
USSR Georgians X   X   X 
USSR Germans X  X    X 
USSR Kazakhs  X  X X  X 
USSR Kirghiz  X   X  X 
USSR Kurds  X  X   X 
USSR Latvians X   X   X 
USSR Lithuanians X   X   X 
USSR Moldavians    X    
USSR Tadzhiks  X  X   X 
USSR Tatars  X  X X  X 
USSR Turkmens  X  X X  X 
USSR Ukrainians   X     
USSR Uzbeks  X  X X  X 
Uzbekistan Russians  X  X X  X 
Venezuela Indigenous Peoples    X    
Vietnam Montagnards  X  X   X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Croats A X       
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Croats B X   X   X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Hungarians  X  X   X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Kosovo Albanians    X    
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Yugoslavia (Serbia) Sandzak Muslims  X  X   X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Serbs  X X    X 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Slovenes  X X    X 
Zambia Bemebe    X    
Zambia Lozi    X    
Zambia Tonga    X    
Zimbabwe Ndebele    X    
289 38 104 7 236 35 20 127 142 243 
 
  
 
